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DEFINITION OF TERMS
Modern Warfare -- combat operations after the introduction of
mechanization to the battlefield.
Strategy — the management and maneuvering of forces up to the
point of contact with the enemy.
Tactics — those methods and techniques of employing forces when
in contact with the enemy.
Counter- M obi l ity -- to impede the enemy by reinforcing the
terrain through the use of obstacles which utilize and improve on
existing obstructions and natural barriers. Obstacles normally
are emplaced in belts or systems which are covered by direct fire
weapons to make them more effective.
M obi l ity — to reduce the efforts of existing or reinforced
obstacles so as to improve or make possible the maneuverability
of tactical units and allow for the forward movement of essential
logistics.
Hasty Operations — require imagination and ingenuity in the use
of available resources, and are normally conducted under enemy
fire when speed is extremely important. In the advance, the
combat engineers should be located with the lead elements of the
maneuvering units so as to be best employed for maintaining
momentum of the attack by reducing the effects of obstructions to
maneuver, and mobility. Engineers also can increase flank
protection by creating hasty obstacles on avenues of enemy
approach to the flanks. In the defence or in blocking
operations, their location is situation dependent. Field
fortification and counter-mobility obstacles are accomplished
when in contact or about to make contact with the enemy, and
normally should consist of fox holes, open weapon emplacements,
and simple obstacles as the situation permits, to increase the
strength of the position and to reduce the mobility,
maneuverability, and offensive advantage of the approaching
enemy.
Deliberate Operations — differ from hasty ones in that they are
more permanent in nature and are accomplished when enemy
interference during preparation is unlikely. In addition,
sufficient time exists for thorough reconnaissance and careful
preparation. In this case, combat engineers can be located to
the rear and called forward to accomplish mossions. Field
fortifications consist of elaborate trenchworks, covered
emplacements, and obstacles as the situation requires.
PREFACE
Through my experiences as an engineer officer in the United
States Army, I quickly learned that one of the greatest problems
during operations on the modern battlefield lay in the
cooperation between arms. This was especially so in the case of
the divisional engineer who, as a participant in various field
exercises, tended to follow the major combat arms across the
maneuver area with no real purpose. The relative capabilities of
the combat engineer were left untapped by maneuver force
commanders who showed very little appreciation or interest in how
these aspects could enhance the combat potential of their units.
This thesis is intended to help in the resolution of this
deficiency by emphasizing the incorporation of the combat
engineer in battlefield operations as an essential aspect of
mechanized warfare.
The theme of this paper is to show historically how and why
the role of the divisional engineer, through the development of
mechanized warfare, evolved from an indirect support function to
one of major influence over battlefield operations. This
transition was contingent on the emancipation of military
doctrine and planning from the constraints of traditional
military elitist attitudes which, in turn, allowed for the
development of the mechanized formation as a strategic weapon.
Through the realization of combined-arms operations, the armored
division, as an independent striking force, revolutionized
warfare. The dynamics of this formation greatly depended on the
mobility and counter-mobility potential of the combat engineer.
Prior to and in the first three years of World War II, the
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effectiveness of armored formations differed significantly
between the Allied and Axis countries. This was due, primarily,
to the degree of combined-arms organization and indoctrination
reached and the role played in it by the combat engineer. In the
Allied nations, the conservative military elites feared the
infringement of mechanization on their traditional, chivalric
concepts of warfare and, consequently, established armored
formations as tactical aids to infantry and cavalry based combat
operations. The combat engineer remained an indirect support
arm, mainly concerned with deliberate and static construction.
This situation persisted despite the theories of Martel, Fuller,
and Liddell Hart who, with foresight, proposed the development of
mechanized formations as the basis of future warfare.
The Axis nations, in contrast, had realized these concepts
almost perfectly by the end of the 1930's. The corporate spirit
and aggressive nationalism induced by Fascism had lifted the
conceptual constraints experienced in the Allied nations and
allowed for the development of the armored formation as an
offensive strategic weapon. Through the application of combined-
arms principles, rapid maneuverability was reintroduced to combat
operations. Thus, the combat engineer, as the proponent of
mobility and counter-mobility, provided greatly for the dynamics
basic to mechanized warfare.
The conflict in North Africa provides a vivid comparison of
the opposing concepts for the employment of mechanized forces.
During these campaigns, two main trends emerged. First, the
decisiveness of the proper employment of the combat engineer as
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part of the mechanized combined-arms team to success on the
dynamic battlefield and, second, the superiority of the strategic
use of armored formations over their tactical use. Throughout
most of the campaigns on the Western Desert, the Allied forces
adhered to the traditional concepts of warfare and, as a result,
were consistently defeated by the dynamic combined-arms team of
the Axis forces. Through a slow process of trial and error, the
Allies eventually adopted the methods of their opponents. The
final decision at El Alamein was significantly dependent on the
Allied assimilation of the combined-arms principles and the
proper employment of the combat engineer into an armored
dominated battlefield.
This thesis will show that the success on the mechanized
battlefield depends, above all else, on the application of
combined-arms operations and on the mobility and counter-mobility
potential of the combat engineer, who provides the dynamics on
which modern warfare is based.
VIII
CHAPTER I
Before mechanized warfare, the combat engineers in European
armies were inhibited from exercising their full potential in
assisting combat operations, on both the tactical and strategical
levels, due the conservative attitudes of their aristocratic
leadership. During this period, cooperation of arms was actively
avoided. Later, with the advent of mechanization, the deep-
rootedness of this relationship retarded the incorporation of the
technical arms, paramount to armored warfare, into combat
operations
.
INTRODUCTION1
Towards the end of the Middle Ages, the military engineer
can first be identified playing a part in army field operations,
as distinct from doing construction. This resulted primarily
from the evolution of warfare itself, as feudalism gave way to
the technological and social changes of the Renaissance and
Reformation. With the increased independence of the towns and
cities with their middle classes, and the introduction of
fortifications and armed foot soldiers for defense of such urban
centers, the old feudal armies, controlled primarily by armored
horsemen, could no longer dominate warfare. Furthermore, through
the development first of the bow and arrow and later of artillery
and muskets the infantry became a viable force on the
battlefield, especially against heavy cavalry, since it could
fight effectively at a distance. It is during this transition
then, as armies began to be organized more around the infantry
arm instead of the cavalry, that the military engineer was first
able to influence combat operations.
In their early employment during the 16th and 17th century,
the military engineers were used in conjunction with artillery
during seiges of fortified towns and fortresses. They had no real
organization or permanency as a distinct body. Normally, a
professional engineer would be contracted to supervise any work
required of a group of civilian laborers during the course of a
campaign. These personnel, called sappers and miners, were
primarily commited to the construction and excavation of cover
and concealment in support of besieging operations. While the
sappers constructed reinforced breastworks for artillery, and
trenches for assault forces in order to breach the fortifications
from above, the miners excavated subterranean galleries to
provide for passage of attacking forces under the walls. Together
with the artillery arm, the military engineers consisted of
artisans and commoners, led by specialists of the bourgeoisie. At
the conclusion of hostilities, as with the rest of the army,
these organizations disbanded until the next Call to Arms.
During the Religious Wars of the 16th and 17th centuries,
the "Feudal Knight" of the nobility, looked on in resentment as
the infantry, assisted by the artillery and military engineers,
gained superiority over the cavalry on the battlefield. Even
though the nobility had to give way to the progress of warfare,
they did not accept the infantry, artillery nor military
engineering as honorable arms. Instead, they considered these new
military skills the product of the urban arts and crafts of the
rising city bourgeoisie, an example of the very economic, social,
and intellectual changes which were disintegrating their
feudalistic way of life. Towards the infantry, however, this
attitude would be greatly amended when, by the early 18th century
the nobility as military entrepreneurs, had easily assimilated
this arm by recruiting regiments for hire from their own
hereditary lands. But, to have attempted this for the technically
oriented arms of artillery and military engineering would have
been too expensive and uncomfortably scientific for the otherwise
romantic mentality of the nobleman. Consequently, these arms
remained under the leadership of the bourgeoisie, and the
contempt of the nobility for them became part of a heritage which
persisted from its feudal origins into modern warfare, so much so
that noblemen who later commanded national armies never were able
to become fully accustomed to their proper use.
As armies grew in size, and success on the battlefield
increasingly depended on training and drill, standing armies
appeared which enabled the sovereigns of emerging nation states
to centralize power and control by suppressing the private armies
of rival lords and providing protection and stability for the
economic aspirations of the ascendant urban bourgeoisie. By the
mid-18th century a new political system in the form of the
dynastic state had been firmly established. The middle class, in
exchange for an economic milieu of perpetual prosperity, was
quite willing to concede the management of the nation and army in
favor of the sovereign, thus allowing them to devote their full
energies to commercial enterprise and profit. This condition
greatly benefited the nobility, who moved in to officer the
expanding standing armies, since the demise of the feudal system
left them with no other livelihood enabling them to maintain, to
a great degree, their traditional influence and social position.
This entrenchment of the nobility in the leadership of the army
brought the military forces as well as the state under control
of the sovereign, for the fate of those in the officer corps
depended, above all else, on the prince.
For the military engineering arm this meant that its
leadership would continue to be fixed in the bourgeoisie and,
thus, in its formal beginnings, it existed as a somewhat
neglected service. Moreover, throughout the evolution of the
dynastic state the developing state bureaucracies were almost
completely based in the progressive and financially powerful
urban centers. Accordingly, from their origins, they stood under
the domination of the bourgeoisie, since law, engineering, and
finance suited the mentality and interests of the keen-witted
businessman better than the land-owner. This administrative
encroachment by the bourgeoisie, in turn, was accepted with
indignation by the nobility who soon grew apprehensive of any new
developments in technology or in the science of warfare, which
they viewed as mainly the products of the progressive and
competetive spirit of their inordinately rationalistic rivals.
Since social position rather than intelligence served as the
criterion to gain an officer's commission and rank within the
army, the noble officer shunned technical education and any
continued theoretical military training, relying instead on
experience in combat. Consequently
, military engineering was
unwisely viewed as a menacing yet unavoidable aberration and,
thus, up until the end of the 18th century generally no
permanent establishments of combat engineers in standing armies
existed.
For the War of the Spanish Succession, however, units were
recruited and, for the first time, the officers and men of combat
engineer units were uniformed and held military rank. During most
of the dynastic wars of the 18th century formations of military
engineers can be identified in support of field operations. These
company or battalion size units of pioneers, sappers, miners and
pontoniers normally were commanded by military engineer officers,
but, frequently also by officers of other arms on a temporary or
mission basis. Since these units did not have a parent engineer
organization. They were in most cases either attached to or
actually formed as part of the artillery, with their primary
function being to support this arm during sieges or on the
battlefield.
The duties of the sapper and the miner had changed very
little, however, the techniques of siege warfare had become far
more effective. A siege process generally started with a trench
dug parallel to the fortifications under attack which, under the
protection of the infantry, was progressively widened and
deepened until it formed a covered road. This excavation, called
a "parallel", was actually an avenue, along which artillery,
transport, and personnel could move sheltered from the detection
and direct fire of the besieged. Next, batteries of guns and
mortars would be installed to gain superiority of fire, and to
silence the enemy guns on the section of the fortification to be
assaulted. This process continued at 500 meter intervals until
the attacking forces were close enough for their heavy artillery
to batter a breach into the ramparts. If necessary a covered road
was dug through the breach itself, thus allowing assault troops
to enter the fortress. Throughout the sapping operation the miner
listened to detect any of the enemy's miners, who normally tried
to construct underground passages beneath friendly parallels in
order to demolish them. After the discovery of such a passage,
the miner could sink an intercepting tunnel; sometimes, the
excavation of galleries was necessary in order to assault the
fortified position by going under the ramparts as in the past,
however; this became much more difficult with the progressive
improvement in the construction of fortifications during the 17th
and 18th century.
Contingents of pioneers began to appear on the battlefield
during the Seven Years War (1756-1763). Initially, every infantry
regiment contained a detachment of pioneers, often incorrectly
called sappers, who provided combat engineering support during
both offensive and defensive operations. These troops normally
worked in small parties and were charged with such tasks as the
building or breaching of field fortifications, the fortification
or reduction of existing man-made structures such as buildings
and walls within a village or farm, and minor road repair to
include the construction of light timber bridges. Frequently,
these missions had to be accomplished under-fire, when pioneers
advanced with an assault force to clear obstacles or breach light
fortifications. By the end of the war, some armies even
consolidated these troops into battalions so that commanding
generals had the capabilities of the pioneer at their immediate
disposal, thus allowing for their most effective utilization at
critical points on the battlefield.
The pontoniers can be identified with field operations as
early as 1689, when the Elector of Brandenburg crossed the Rhine
with 20,000 troops over an improvised pontoon bridge. By the
middle of the 18th century most standing armies had bridging
trains and pontoniers while on campaign. Missions of these
troops included the assembly of their pontoon bridges as well as
the construction of heavy timber trestle bridges over any water
obstacle which impeded the field mobility of the army. The
equipment of the pontonier company consisted of approximatly 20
to 30 pontoon boats of wood or sheet metal, each carried on a
light two-wheeled cart or several carried on a four-wheeled
transport, with anchors, breastlines, boathooks, and timber
planking for the superstructure. The pontonier companies were
normally attached to the heavy artillery trains and detached on a
temporary basis for individual missions.
Although the value of the different military engineer
organizations was only slowly and begrudgingly acknowledged,
their influence on combat operations, together with improvements
in artillery and the general increase in the efficiency and
capabilities of the regular units of the standing armies, were
making warfare far too complex for campaigns to be entrusted to
military amateurism, as up to this point. As the management of
armies becamce more complicated, by the mid-18th century, most of
the dynastic goverments realized the importance of specialized
knowledge by military commanders in the principles of warfare.
This can be seen in the establishment of royal schools of formal
military education such as the Royal Military Academy of
Artillery and Engineering, England (1741), the Ecole Militaire,
France (1751), the Wiener Neustadt Mi 1 itiaerakademie, Austria
(1752), and the Academie des Nobles, Brandenburg-Prussia (1765).
Besides tactics, strategy, drill, and ceremony, these schools
devoted many of their programs of study to techniques in field
engineering, and to the disciplines of fortification, topography,
artillery and mathematics. At first the nobility avoided these
schools, and only the nobles who could not afford to purchase a
commission and the bourgeoisie, when allowed, attended. However,
with the middle class reaching a superior level of intelligence
and wealth and also showing a sudden interest in military
careers, the nobility felt their leadership monopoly challenged.
Thus, towards by the end of the 18th century the nobility began
to take education more seriously, in an attempt to gain a
dominant level of attendance within the military schools.
This did much for final acknowledgement and an appreciation
of military engineering by the leadership in the standing armies.
In some cases the poor nobility even began to enter the artillery
and engineer branches which, as a conquence of this change in
attitude and of the demands of the Napoleonic Wars, was
established at last. Nevertheless, the greater part of the
nobility still did not consider these respectable or honorable
corps. Thus, there was always room in these arms for the
bourgeois officer but very seldom could he penetrate the ranks
of the better infantry regiments or, especially, the cavalry
which the aristocracy continued to arrogate for itself.
In the various European armies the engineer branches were
originally established as staffs of engineer officers which
virtually had no troops under their command. Although, due to
Vauban's fortification enterprise, the French had created the
Corps des Ingenieurs de Genie Militaire as early as 1704, this
unique type of organization was not adopted by the other European
powers until the mid-18th century. Even though these staff
sections were called "corps" they must not be confused with true
branches or arms of service, for they had no permanent
organizations under their administrative jurisdiction and, as
dicussed earlier, combat engineer units were mustered and
attached to other branches during their period of service.
This condition would change abruptly with the outbreak of
the French Revolution and a warfare of mass armies which was to
follow. At Valmy (1792), the artillery saved the Revolutionary
Army of France; mainly officered by the bourgeoisie it was
virtually untouched when the army was purged of its aristocratic
leadership. The same was true for the engineer staff section
which had been amalgamated with all miner, sapper, and pioneer
units into a single composite corps by 1793, in order to meet the
military engineering requirements of the mass army. Realizing the
effectiveness and importance of these arms for a 'levee en mass'
army, the revolutionary leaders changed the precedence in the
army (1797), giving the artillery the lead over all other
branches, followed by engineers, infantry and cavalry. Clearly,
the technical and unitarian considerations of the bourgeois had
gained a most influential position in military operations and,
henceforth, would irreversibly alter the science of warfare
forever.
Napoleon took the revolutionary organization a step further;
his massed artillery, "Grand Batteries", dominated the
battlefield, forcing armies to depend more and more on field
fortifications. In addition, the enhanced mobility of the French
armies made bridging and road repair an essential facet of any
military operation. By 1812, all the major powers of Europe, with
the exception of Great Britain, had also coalesced their combat
engineering assets into permanent "Corps of Engineers"
establishments, comparable in composition to the French. These
corps consisted of separate companies or battalions of sappers,
pioneers, miners or pontoniers, as in the French, Austrian and
Russian Armies, or, as in the Prussian Army, of combined Pioneer
Field Companies of miner, sapper and pontonier sections in a
normal proportion of 1:2:1. In addition, engineer officers were
frequently assigned as advisors in both brigade and corps
headquarters. When deployed the combat engineer units were
attached to other combat formations on a mission basis or for the
duration of a campaign. However, frequently engineer "field
parks" would be constituted from which armies and corps drew
companies, or sometimes only detachments, on the basis of need.
By the end of the war combat engineer units accounted for
approximatly one per cent of all troops on the battlefield.
The permanency of the engineer branches came about as a
result of the military reforms, accomplished, in the Prussian
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Army under the Scharnhorst/Gneisenau team, in the Russian Army
under Barclay de Tolly's staff, and in the Austrian Army under
Archduke Charles, as the allied governments attempted to cope
with the absolute warfare of Napoleonic France. The expansive
remodeling of these armies into national forces had been
implemented with the intention of providing concessions to
stimulate popular enthusiasm for the war effort, without
endangering or weakening the existing dynastic order. Thus, even
though the branches of artillery and military engineering were
raised considerably in precedence and size in order to improve
the combat efficiency of the army, and though the bourgeoisie
entered the officer ranks of all branches in ample numbers, the
aristocracy maintained martial control, however, far from
exclusive. Consequently, with the end of the war and the
restoration of the old order the nobility tried to regain that
leadership monopoly in the army which they had enjoyed during the
18th century.
This refeudalization process faced little opposition from
the bourgeoisie which generally was more concerned with
exploiting new methods of industrialization or with their
professions than with military service; they considered national
militias little more than organizations which distracted from
their main interests, private enterprise. Therefore, by the mid-
19th century professional regular armies reappeared, with
conscription being superceded when possible in favor of
enlistment, and with the nobility once again predominating the
officer corps. In the Romantic Movement, which prevailed
throughout the literary world during the first half of the 19th
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century, the aristocratic reactionaries dircted this revolt
against rationalism and Bourgeois materialism. Unfortunately,
through their passionate appeals they gained popular support for
a conservatism which isolated the army from those steady advances
made in technology and machinery which in reality were germane to
warfare. Even into the 20th century military innovations were
accomplished only after great blood-letting or defeat had
demonstrated their essentiality. In short, the mentality of
feudalism once again permeated military thought; the officer
remained a romantic, even in the industrial age.
Consequently, after the Napoleonic Wars, the
embourgeoisement of the army was reversed and, with the exception
of the Franch military system, only the engineer and artillery
branches were open to be officered by non-nobles, who held up to
80 percent of the commissions. Once again, the combat engineer
stood lowest in respect of the rest of the army. In Prussia the
Pioneer Field Companies took over guard of the garrison when all
other troops went on maneuvers. Great Britain still had no
regular combat engineer units, while the Austrian combat
engineers were often detailed to road and bridge repair instead
of participating in the maneuvers and training with the other
combat formations. In France, on the other hand, the precedence
in the army had changed very little since the Napoleonic Wars;
the elite of the nation was selected for commissions in the Corps
de Genie Militaire before other branches.
Despite the renaissance of the professional army, conditions
for its continued existence were soon displaced with the
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emergence of the Machine Age in the later part of the 19th
century. The major proponent and motivative force behind this
transition was Prussia, whose process of industrialization during
this period, coinciding with a population explosion, had too
quickly gained momentum. As the bourgeoisie made startling
advances in most other fields, the army stagnated. In order to
keep pace and to maintain their social influence, the nobility
pressed for a military apparatus which would once again allow for
promotion and an adequate supply of positions, a much enlarged
army. This, together with the desire of the military hierarchy to
bring the army under the complete control of the King and his
General Staff, led to army reorganization in 1861, accomplished
under Generals von Manteuffel and von Moltke, during which the
leadership of the army was doubled in size.
Integrating new technological advances, including railway
and telegraph systems, the new organization, now managed almost
absolutely by the General Staff, consisted exclusively of line
regiments, manned at between half and two thirds enlisted
strength at peace time. In time of need these were brought to
full authorization by calling up the reserve. Thus, the regular
army could expand by more than one third of its size within a
month, allowing for numerical superiority over any other army in
Europe, except for Russia. With the victories of 1864, 1866, and
1870 Prussia proved that the mass army was supreme on the
battlefield. Before the turn of the century, all the major
powers of Europe had in varying degrees espoused the Prussian
model. Ironically, as Europe approached its first total war,
industrialization had caused warfare and its preparation to pass
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gradually from the exclusive control of the aristocracy to the
bougeoisie; with World War I this process would be completed.
The reappearance of mass armies and the improvement in
weaponry hit significantly at the role of the combat engineer.
Although their equipment and mission changed very little from the
Napoleonic Era through World War I, their numbers and importance
to combat operations increased substantially. During the first
half of the 19th century tactics resembled those used in the
Napoleonic Wars. Gradually, however, the blood-letting of the
European and American conflicts of the 1859-1870 period drove
home the realization that the increased range and effectiveness
of the breech- loading rifle, permitting soldiers to bring down
lethal fire from behind cover or from trenches and earthen
redoubts, had made close formations obsolete. In addition,
because rifle-fire caused such havoc amongst gun-crews,
breastworks became essential for artillery when deployed in
close-range positions. With the advent of the machinegun tactics
were further complicated, forcing combat formations into field
fortifications for survival. By the turn of the century, every
army corps had one or two battalions of pioneers allotted, which
consisted of sappers and miners, with horsedrawn transport for
tools and equipment, and a pontoon train. Their tasks were
modified to mining and field fortifications, while trench digging
and barbed wire entanglements emerged as their primary missions.
At the outbreak of World War I, the combat engineers were
initially employed in siege operations; however, this changed
soon after the battle of the Marne (1914) , when the War gradual ly
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stagnated into a process of trench warfare. The fighting arms had
been completely unprepared for the change in tactics and strategy
and, as the war dragged on, they depended more and more on the
technical assistance of the combat engineer. This need was
further compounded with the employment of trench mortars and
massed heavy artillery which forced the combat arms even deeper
underground. As the war progressed the ratio of combat engineers
to other combat units was far from adequate. By the time mine
warfare and attack from the air reached a peak between 1916 and
1917, most armies had reorganized their engineer branches
deploying the majority of combat engineers in battalion-size
pioneer units at the division level. These consisted of a
headquarters, several pioneer field companies, a searchlight
section, and a bridging train. It was here, with the divisional
battalion, that the combat engineer was initially employed in
both effectively situated and large enough organizations to
influence significantly combat operations on the modern
battlefield.
Also during this period of the war, the dimensional
development of combat engineering in general reached its zenith.
In the German army alone, the number of pioneers in all ranks had
risen to 170 000; their strength had almost tripled in size
during the course of the war. After 1917, however, the armies met
increasing difficulties in finding reinforcements and the war
ended before the innovations of the tank and the aeroplane could
make a major influence on combat operations. Thus, the conflict
came to a close with the armies virtually deadlocked in trench
warfare, and before the new divisional engineers really had the
15
opportunity to demonstrate their effectiveness in modern warfare.
Their unique possibilities would be realized only after the
theoretical and practical dialectics of their proper employment
in mechanized warfare had been resolved; a process first
initiated at the end of World War I and climaxing at the height
of conflict in North Africa during World War II.
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CHAPTER II
THE DIVISIONAL ENGINEERS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MECHANIZED
WARFARE IN THE ALLIED CAMP FROM 1916 TO 1940
During the last two years of World War I, the Allied armies
were the first and only ones to employ armored formations to a
significant degree. Their purpose was to tactically assist
infantry and cavalry based offensive operations in breaking the
the deadlock of trench warfare, with the combat engineers
providing indirect support through deliberate and static
construction. The innovation of the armored vehicle prompted the
formulation of a mechanized landpower theory in Britain, during
the inter-war years, which advocated combined-arms armored
formations as the key element in future warfare. The divisional
engineer was given the essential roles of ensuring rapid
maneuverability and of enhancing anti-tank defence. These new
concepts were not assimilated by the traditionally oriented army
leadership, which caused the Allies to enter World War II
entirely unprepared to wage mechanized warfare.
Early Mechanization
During the First World War, the influence of combat
engineers and artillery dominated the battlefield. It was siege
warfare on a grand scale; in order to attack, combat units had
virtually to trench forward and then assault an enemy who, in
elaborate field fortifications, could easily channel and contain
such offensive movement with barbed wire and then decimate it
with machine-gun and massive indirect artillery fire. The highly
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cherished arm, the cavalry, became useless and the vulnerability
of the infantry in massed attack formations made them completely
ineffective against this seemingly inpenetratable defense system.
Military leadership, inhibited by their aristocratic, chivalrous
notions of honor and glory, and with little practical knowledge
of or experience in this type of combat, was unable to comprehend
the importance of mechanics and technology in modern warfare and
thus lacked the imagination to assimilate the products of the
Industrial Revolution into it. Throughout the War, the former
dynamic combat arms, infantry and cavalry, were unable to break
the deadlock, which made them almost completely dependent on the
support of the engineer and artillery man for survival.
The generals, without the propensity for the use of
mechanical aid, employed outdated tactics resulting in
catastrophic waste of human life. Consequently, especially in
the Entente countries, France, Britain, and Russia, this led to
intervention in the direction of the War by civilian governments.
Unlike the preindustria 1 armies of the 19th century, warfare
between Nations-In-Arms ,* witnessed for the first time during
World War I, depended completely on popular support and morale.
As the conflict evolved to a warfare of mass production, it
gripped all national activities, and war became an extensive
national business, supported by a regimented, all inclusive
military industrial complex, the management of which reached far
beyond the capabilities of a military command organization.!
A Nation-In-Arms has an army organized around the trained
civilian reserve, which is ready immediately to supplement the
standing army at the outbreak of war.
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While the generals called for more rifles and bayonets, the
politicians realized the need for employment of modern industrial
principles in warfare. As the conflict dragged on, the civilian
leaders expanded their influence over the conduct of the War and,
in most cases, insisted on the development and integration of war
machines into combat operations.^ Even so, the aristocratic
mentality could not grasp the significance of the new devices;
thus the submarine, the airplane, the tank, chemical agents, etc.
were experimented with but never dynamically employed. These
conditions set the background for the birth of mechanized
warfare.
It was also during this period that the more intellectual,
non-aristocratic officers, a group which had seriously followed
military careers since the last quarter of the 19th century,
began to exert their influence within the armies. New blood
flowed in many of these junior leaders who, although only holding
positions such as chiefs of staff, division, or regimental
commanders, fully appreciated the role of mechanization and, as
war technologists, aligned themselves with the more scientific
approach of the civilian leaders to break out of the static
warfare surrounding them. It was from this generation, the
leaders of post World War I and World War II, that a selected
band of advocates rose and carried the development of mechanized
warfare from its experimental stages to reality.
This small group of military men, most of whom came from the
technical arms, should be credited with taking the tank to the
battlefield. The British were the main proponents of the new war
machine, with the two Royal Engineer officers, Lieutenant-
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Colonels H. J. Elles and E. S. Swinton, pioneering and commanding
the first armored unit^, which, by May 1917, had evolved into a
separate tank corps. This formation was developed purely as an
auxiliary to spearhead the infantry attack and provided a bullet-
proof device capable of eliminating the machine-gun and of
smashing through field fortifications or barbed-wire
entanglements. This allowed the infantry and cavalry to
penetrate the enemy's main trench system and, through this break,
to roll up his flanks and to continue the advance in a mobile
warfare, beyond fixed defences. At Cambrai (Nov. -Dec. 1917),
these tactics were employed properly for the first time;
unfortunately, the attack eventually failed when cooperation
between tank and infantry units broke in the face of enemy
counter-attack. Nevertheless, the importance of the tank had
been proved. Before the War's end, the offensive employment of
tanks on a massive scale was being planned. In "Plan 1919", the
Allies intended to strike a 90-mile front with a combined
British, French, and American tank force spearhead consisting of
4,992 tanks. Besides the customary infantry, artillery, and
cavalry formations, this operation included motorized infantry
and tactical air support.
The engineers' duties during these initial armored offensive
operations was limited to improving mobility of rear-area and
follow-on communications and the construction of roads,
railroads, and bridges. ' However, after the tank units
encountered serious difficulties in crossing trench systems and
with the assumption that the Germans would resort to large-scale
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land mining, a few land mines having already been used in 1918 6
,
the Royal Engineers took the initiative to equip themselves for
support of armored assaults on fortified positions. Special
engineer tanks were developed 7 , capable of tasks such as barbed-
wire entanglement removal as well as the transport and
emplacement of a 35-ton, 21-foot tank assault bridge. By October
1918, the first mechanized engineer units were formed at
Christchurch, three battalions, each equipped with 48 of these
special bridging tanks and twelve strong bridges to take the
heaviest tanks. These units were hardly established when the War
ended resulting in the disbandment of two of these battalions.
The remaining battalion, under the command of Lieutenant-
Colonel G. Le Q. Martel, was reduced in size, after the
Armistice, and renamed "The Experimental Bridging Company". In
1919, this company designed and tested a new engineer tank
prototype capable of propelling a heavy steel roller in front of
the tracks for detonating anti-tank mines without damage, of
pushing a 70-foot heavy bridge mounted on idle tracks which could
be launched under fire, of clearing barbed wire obstacles with
grapneles, and of firing demolition charges suspended from the
front derrick. Although never adopted by the army, this piece of
equipment represents the foresight possessed by many engineer
officers 8 at a time when most other arms continued to think along
conservative, non-mechanized lines. The Experimental Bridging
Company remained as the only armored assault engineer unit in the
world well into the 1920's, when the special bridging tanks
became obsolete and armored units began to practice mobile
operations in which the heavy 1917 tanks of trench warfare could
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not keep pace.
Although the engineer arm of other armies had experimented
with various devices of mechanized warfare, none had gone nearly
as far as the British Royal Engineers. But even this progress
was soon stifled when in 1923 the program of assigning special
engineer officers to the Royal Tank Corps was abolished, thus
eliminating the engineers' participation in further research and
development of armored operations. In spite of the advances made
by the engineers in the Royal Tank Corps, organization and
equipment of all other divisional engineer units had changed very
little in the British as well as in all the other European
armies. The combat engineer organization throughout the 1920's
was virtually identical to that of the late 19th century in many
aspects including the types of personnel, tools, equipment, and
horse transport. In most armies this state of combat readiness,
including that of the engineer arm, existed right up to World War
II.
Theories of the Military Intellectuals
The degree of mechanization that was accomplished can be
attributed primarily to the military intellectuals and disciples
of mechanized landpower who, as stated earlier, were the junior
leaders during World War I. This select group fully realized the
potential of the new war machines and strove to convert the
military leadership to mechanized warfare, in the hope of
avoiding future senseless staughter by reviving mobility and
offensive maneuver. The fountainhead for this movement developed
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in Great Britain around the unofficial military intellectuals
such as Colonel J. F. C. Fuller, Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, and
the two Royal Engineer officers, Lieutenant-Colonels P. Hobart
and G. Le Q. Martel who were both destined to be division
commmanders during World War II. All these officers, with the
exception Liddell Hart, had gathered practical experience with
tanks, either during or immediately after the War. Together,
through their publications and associations, they would develop
the blueprints for mechanized warfare which, ironically, would
put into practice with perfection by the German army in the
Blitzkrieg operations at the beginning of World War II.
At the beginning of World War I, the purpose of the tank
units was to act as an auxiliary force by helping the infantry to
penetrate and clear successive lines of trenches. 10 surprise was
gained in the armor supported attack, since now the tank could
take over the former artillery tasks of destroying wire obstacles
and of covering the advance of attacking forces. The tank
spearhead led the sudden, head-on attack through the wire, the
infantry following by sections in single file using the tank's
protection against direct-fire weapons. An indirect artillery
barrage waited until after the infantry attack was launched and
fire lifted in accordance with the planned rate of advance. Once
through the wire, the tanks either turned or crossed over and
turned down the trench systems and engaged the enemy occupants,
with the infantry performing a mop-up mission and assaulting
strong points. After the establishment of a gap, the cavalry
passed through to seize strategic areas, far to the rear. This
advance was followed by breakthrough infantry formations which
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could reinforce any gains.
In the early stages of their theories, the military
intellectuals realized that a more powerful penetration and
pursuit could be attained if tank formations instead of cavalry
seized the strategic objectives. This was reinforced, especially
after the cavalry failed at Cambrai, when it could not be moved
forward guickly enough to exploit the breakthrough, due to their
vulnerability. In addition, the attack lost momentum when the
follow-on infantry could not keep up with the tanks after
penetrating the defensive line. The tank formations themselves
faced serious problems when 179 of the 378 tanks fell out of the
attack during the first day, 71 due to mechanical troubles, and
43 were eliminated through ditching. Obviously, an independent
tank force was needed, capable of making a penetration and
exploiting the breakthrough afterwards. It was this realization
that led Martel, Fuller and Hobart to formalize the initial
concepts of mechanized landpower.
Martel, Brigade Major of the 2nd Tank Brigade at the time,
was the first to theorize about armored forces.^ He saw tank
forces operating like a naval fleet, where the mission of the
tank was to seek out and destroy the enemy's tanks. These tank
formations operated from (and were supported by) static "tank
bases", much like a naval base, protected by anti-tank trenches,
landmine belts, and "pillars of wood or concrete sunk in the
ground to form an artificial forest". The armored forces were
accompanied by combat engineer and signal units, also mounted in
tanks designed to assist them in their respective missions. One
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can clearly see the influence of Martel's professional combat
engineering experience on his theories. He can be cited as the
originator of such famous obstacle concepts as the anti-tank
ditch, the minefield belt, and the dragon's teeth, which were
perfected in the 1930's and 40's, and are still today the most
effective anti-tank obstacles available to the combat engineer.
Although he had defined the engineer mission in armored warfare,
his theories were far from specific. Of more consequence was
Martel's influence on Fuller who, in turn, would take his ideas a
step further and establish more detailed instructions on how
these theories should be accomplished.
Fuller's concept resembled Martel's in that it espoused the
idea of mobile armies exercising a decisive influence on the
battlefield through the combination of fire-power, mobility and
protection. His fundamental concerns, however, were the details
of tactics in armored warfare, and the most advantageous
organization and employment of the arms involved. His initial
ideas are discernible in Plan 1919 12 in which he proposed to
attack the enemy's will to fight instead of his physical ability
to do so. Once the breakthrough was made, light tanks 'en masse'
and motorized infantry would quickly move in behind the enemy on
each flank, head directly for the respective army corps' and
divisional headquarters to assault command and control centers,
establish systems of machine gun positions which would isolate
the forward garrisons from their supply and reserves, and
ultimately cut an entire army or group from its command,
commander, and staff. Without these essential communications the
combat units would be paralyzed and forced to surrender when
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faced with determined, carefully mounted tank, infantry, and
artillery attack against their front. Thus, the command
organization was the primary target in Fuller's mind.
During the 1920's, Fuller's ideas were finalized in more
concrete and technically specific terms. 13 Holding true to the
naval concept of mechanical warfare, he advocated that linear
warfare should be replaced with area warfare. In this kind of
conflict, the army should be organized into a mechanized force
(consisting of reconnaissance and main battle tank formations,
small and mobile, light or medium in class) which acted as a
dynamic combative entity, and the non-mechanized force
(consisting mainly of mass non-mechanized infantry formations)
which followed up on battlefield success and consolidated gains.
The defence was just as vital as the offence in combat
operations. As in Plan 1919, the primary mission of the
mechanized force was to destroy the enemy's morale by conducting
deep, disruptive penetration into his rear, aimed at paralyzing
systems of command, control, and service support. The mechanized
forces, operating as independent organizations, were divided
into both a tank wing, consisting of reconnaissance, artillery,
and combat armored vehicles, and an anti-tank wing, composed of
transportable anti-tank weapons, both highly mobile and well
armed for mechanized combat. During the advance, the tank was to
led the anti-tank wing. However, once halted, the anti-tank wing
was to establish immediately a "waagon laager", defended by
machine-guns, anti-tank guns, minefields, and field
fortifications to shelter auxiliary support units, and to serve
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as a base for the tank wing. From these "waagon laagers" the
tank wing could sally forth to attack or seek refuge in them when
counter-attacked and forced to retire. The prime example of this
type of laager is the funnel formation which defended a salient.
**"'"'n
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F16. 2
Figuresland2: Defensive Base from which Mobile Forces can
Operate. See footnote 14.
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When used in conjunction with engineer anti-tank obstacles, it
could very effectively regain the initiative for the tank wing's
attack by slowing, channelizing, and then neutralizing the
enemy's thrust through the coordination of mobile with static
defence.
First, a zone of defensive works should be
constructed across the base of the salient, so that,
should the enemy penetrate its flank, its defenders
will have a line of resistance to withdraw to.
Secondly, defensive works should be thrown up on the
flanks of the salient, forming a protective funnel.
These, in the case of armored formations, should be
manned by the anti-tank wings. Then, when the
[covering forces] working outside the salient [are]
compelled to fall back, it should do so on the flanks
of the salient, as shown in Figure 2. In Figure 1, the
[reconnaissance screen] is still out, but is being
driven in. In Figure 2, it is shown by letters A 1 and
A 2
, whereas B 1 and B 2 are the defended wings of the
funnel. The mobile troops should be divided into three
groups C 1
, C 2 , and C 3 , of which C 2 is within the
salient and C 1 and C 3 outside it and on its flank.
Then, should the enemy - D - penetrate between B 1 an
B z
,
C 2 can advance and engage him, while C 1 and C
attack him in flank and rear. Should the enemy attack
B^, then C1 can operate against his right flank, while
C 2 , or part of that force, operate against his left
flank by advancing up the funnel and moving out of it.
The same maneuver should be carried out, if the enemy
attacks B 2
. The secret of this particular distribution
is: [1] it establishes a defensive base from which the
mobile forces can operate, and [21 it induces an enemy
to offer a flank to counterattack.14
During defensive operations. Fuller adhered to the area
principle as follows. The anti-tank wings were to establish a
defensive system of mutually supporting strong-points where all
inner flanks between these positions were covered by overlapping
anti-tank fires and anti-tank obstacles. They were fashioned in
such a way that they would channelize the enemy offensive into
areas where he could be counter-attacked with advantage by the
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tank wing, not necessarily to counter-attack an enemy force which
had broken through the defensive system. 15 The tank wing, the
mobile counter-attacking force, was kept in the rear and towards
the exposed flank of the defensive system for such purposes.
These defensive systems were to be developed in and around areas
where the terrain and natural obstacles favored mobile defence
and allowed for depth. In open country, the anti-tank wings had
to establish an all-around defensive perimeter. It was in the
defence that Fuller saw the great value of combat engineering.
It is interesting that a light infantryman such as Fuller
would put more emphasis on combat engineers than on his own arm.
He saw no value of the infantry in the mechanized force, except
for being what he called "field pioneers", to assist in the
construction of field fortification, but he asserted the
importance of the combat engineer for the support of of both the
tank and the anti-tank wings. In defining the engineer support
mission for mechanized warfare, Fuller picked up where Martel had
left off by specifying further their function. 16 Differing
somewhat from his predecessor, he put the combat engineers only
in the anti-tank wing, in which they were to be both motorized
and mechanized. To assist the combat engineer in accomplishing
his mission, he saw the need for such counter-mobility equipment
as anti-tank trench diggers and minelayers, and mobility
equipment such as minesweepers or exploders, flame-throwing
tanks, assault tanks, and bridging tanks. Generally, tank
operations were based on two categories of anti-tank auxiliary
troops, one consisting of artillery anti-tank forces, the other
32
of combat engineer mine layers, anti-tank trap, and obstacle
constructers. Although the combat engineer was primarily
concerned with anti-tank operations, he also was to be
interested in enhancing friendly mobility, cover, and protection.
To Fuller, these concerns were all interrelated, for he
believed that the advent of small, fully mobile forces would make
it easier to maneuver around hostile flanks and ultimately to
assault rear areas. This generated a greater need for field
fortifications and anti-tank defences, not only to defend
logistical bases and headquarters but also to block narrow
avenues of approach and key terrain, much as the fortress systems
had done up until the mid-19th century along routes of
communication. Thus, improvement in mobility increased in area
field defences in depth; the need for combat engineers in
mechanized warfare would be equal to, if not greater, than it had
been in World War I. The combat engineer, however, still was an
auxiliary force and limited in the support of a virtually all-
tank concept of warfare, and, due to its vulnerability, primarily
left under the protection of the anti-tank wing.
In the defensive mode, the combat engineer should be mainly
concerned with counter-mobility*, field fortifications, and the
improvement of defences, with obstacles being emplaced and
erected to impede the attacker. Systems of interlocking strong-
points shielded by minefields would replace entrenchments
protected by barbed-wire entanglements. 17 when possible, anti-
tank obstacles were to be immediately in front of dug-in
Bold printed expressions are included in a list of definitions
at the beginning of this thesis.
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positions and covered by fire, and joined with natural obstacles
such as rivers, sunken roads, ect.. Minefields were to consist
of rows of mines laid diagonally to halt and deflect movement and
were to be covered by dug-in anti-tank weapons. To prevent
infantry infiltration, barbed wire fences could be erected. In
addition, anti-tank trenches or slits (10'L x 2'W x 4'H) should
be excavated to block high speed avenues of approach onto the
anti-tank defences. Besides assisting in their construction,
Fuller considered the combat engineer primarily responsible for
planning and coordinating the placement of anti-tank defences,
ensuring that the anti-tank obstacle systems would allow for
effective mobile counter-attack and that all obstacles were
covered by interlocking fields of fire. He fully realized that
an obstacle not covered was ineffective.
Once the tank wing counter-attacked the special engineer
tanks would accompany them to support mobility over natural
obstacles such as rivers and to accommodate assaults through man-
made barriers including anti-tank ditches, minefields, and road
blocks. If the attack was successful, the anti-tank wing would
close in behind the tank wing so the advance could continue.
This process repeated itself until the mission was accomplished.
Clearly, Fuller saw mechanized warfare as a contest between
highly mobile all-tank formations, putting little value in the
anti-tank gun and the airplane as offensive weapons. To him, the
plane was a reconnaissance aid and the anti-tank gun a primary
defence support weapon, the infantry a mop-up and occupation
force. Although Hobart refined Fuller's theories and experimented
with some of these assets, Basil Liddell Hart was the theorist
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who would incorporate these final elements into the Blitzkrieg
formula. 18 The ideas of Liddell Hart contrasted with those of
both Martel and Fuller only in that he envisioned the mechanized
force as an integrated, combined-arms team, where all arms,
including a significant portion of mechanized infantry (in
armored carriers with anti-tank guns), amalgamated their specific
capabilities in combat operations. It was the first theory which
awarded the infantry (Hart labeled them "Tank-Marines") as well
as the auxiliary combat arms an important role in offensive
operations
.
Liddell Hart's intention was to inject opportunism into
mechanized warfare, with independent, self-sufficient, mobile
combat teams, incorporating all arms and thus capable of dealing
with all possible situations which might be encountered on a
fluid, modern battlefield. Supporting arms were to be fully
mechanized and permanently attached to a tank/mechanized infantry
(anti-tank) oriented divisional force. Thus, this composite,
versatile formation possessed the spontaneity of action to attack
the enemy almost anywhere at any time. Liddel 1 Hart saw that the
chief advantage of such a force, employed as a spearhead, was
that it could feel out enemy weak points and exploit them, no
matter where they were located and, much like a stream, follow
the avenues of least resistance, that of the "expanding torrent".
The successes were to be consolidated by the follow-on motorized
and non-motorized divisions. The "expanding torrent" mission
required a new formation which he called the New Model Division,
organized into three composite brigades and one support brigade.
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The composite brigade consisted of one heavy tank battalion, one
medium tank battalion, and three battalions of tank marines. The
support brigade included artillery, engineers, signal, motor
transport, and pertinent service troops. 19
Liddell Hart also applied to mechanized warfare what he
called the "baited gambit", which was essentially an offensive
strategy combined with defensive tactics:
You may be able to seize points which the enemy,
sensitive to the threat, will be constrained to attack.
Thus you wil 1 invite him to a repulse which in turn may
be exploited by a riposte. Such a counterstroke,
against an exhausted attacker, is much less difficult
than the attack on a defended position. 20
It was a strategy of luring an opponent to attack your force
while you had your defensive advantage and then, after his
assault failed, launching a tactical offensive to destroy his
enervated forces before he could recover. It was a highly fluid,
fast paced operation, in which the speed of the tank was to be
used to the utmost. However, the existing heavy artillery,
essential for defence, was not suited for mobile warfare. This
convinced Liddell Hart that greater emphasis had to be placed on
the combination of tanks and aircraft. The use of tactical air
support to strafe and bomb the enemy would be a potent substitute
for heavy artillery in mechanized warfare.
In most respects, Liddell Hart agreed with Fuller, but his
concepts tended to give a more realistic estimation of how
mechanized warfare should be conducted on the strategic level.
For this reason, Liddell Hart's concepts significantly influenced
the combat engineer mission. Supporting a highly mobile, armored
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formation as an equal partner, placed requirements on the
engineer far different from what had traditionally been expected.
First, to match the tempo of Liddell Hart's strategy and tactics,
almost the entire combat engineer force had to be mounted in
vehicles of comparable mobility and protection to those serving
the combat units, 21 namely, armored cross-country troop carriers.
Second, the engineer's training and equipment had to be modified
to support hasty 22 but effective field fortification
construction, obstacle emplacement, and assault breach/river
crossing operations. 23 Combat engineering techniques had to be
simplified and streamlined but, at the same time kept efficient
and effective. The troops had to be organized and thoroughly
endoctrinated for fast paced operations. In addition, modern
equipment, transportable, durable, heavy duty, rapidly erected or
put into operation, and completely mechanized, was of paramount
importance.
Operations of a deliberate 2 ** nature would not be suited for
this type of warfare, so that a fundamental readjustment to the
demands of the new tactics had to be made. Traditional,
cumbersome, and luxurious accounterment had to give way to field
expediency and operability. The engineers, being one of the most
equipment heavy arms, had to adjust more drastically to this
change of mission than most other branches of service.
Representing both, the mobility and counter-mobility forces, the
combat engineer had to keep the friendly stream flowing by
busting the dams of man-made or natural obstacles in its path,
and build the dam that would slow down the enemy stream. To
accomplish these tasks, the combat engineers needed modern
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pontoon bridging (heavy enough to carry tanks) for assault river
crossing, air compressors for powering engineer mechanical
devices, materials and equipment for the breaching or
installation of battlefield effective obstacles (such as
minefields, road craters, tank ditches, abatis, wire
entanglements, and bridge demolitions), and armored cross-country
vehicles to carry the combat engineer with equipment on his
mission. Much of this equipment was available on the civilian
economy but almost none of it was carried on army inventories.
Experimentation was accomplished, however, and here again the
British led the way.
British Development of Mechanized Warfare
As early as 1923, the British army had been tinkering with
tank formations. One year later, at Aldershot, the new Vickers
Tank* had made its debut and dominated the battlefield due to an
almost total lack of special anti-tank weapons, and the lack of
progress made in special anti-tank training since the inception
of armored vehicles. 25 m 1926, however, the army began to
experiment seriously with mechanized warfare, to include
organization and techniques of employment, utilizing the limited
funds available. Consequently, with the influence of the
mechanized landpower theorists in full sway, the "Experimental
Armored Force" was formed in Salisburg Plain (1927) and put under
the command of Brigadier-General R. J. Collins. 26 The Force was
Vickers Medium Tank MKI: The first British service tank to have
all-round traverse and geared elevation for the 3-pound gun;
could cruse at 20 miles per hour; 11.7 tons.
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patterned after the Fullerite concept and composed of one
battalion (equal to 48) Vickers Tanks, one field artillery
brigade (tractor drawn), one light battery (with guns on trucks),
one machine gun battalion (in cross-country trucks), one
motorized field company (Royal Engineers), and one signal
company. The training exercise revolved around three kinds of
maneuvers: strategical reconnaissance in place of independent
cavalry, cooperation with main forces, and an independent mission
lasting up to 48 hours. The Force spent most of its efforts in
coordinating movement together, the slowest and least protected
worrying about survivability while on the move.
The engineer element, No. 17 Field Company R. E. commanded
by Major Martel
,
was such a problem unit. It was motorized using
3-ton trucks and 30-cwt. trucks to transport men and equipment,
including an air compressor and sufficient pontoon equipment for
bridging the small rivers about the plain. 27 The most
significant accomplishment of the combat engineers during this
experiment was to demonstrate that river obstacles would not
necessarily be a major deterrent to tank operations. A new
device, light timber "stepping stones", was tried for the first
time. It somewhat resembled the paddle wheel of a river boat
and, when several were dropped into a stream or anti-tank ditch,
tanks could cross over them. 28 Crossing were also made over an
improvised 60-ft. light box-grinder bridge and the pontoon
bridge. Strangely enough, no anti-tank devices or methods were
tested, with mobility being the only concern. In addition, no
steps were taken to introduce an armored combat engineer force, a
concept Major Martel himself had proposed. With the lessons
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learned from the maneuvers, it was hoped, however, that the
entire Force would be armored, but this scheme was far ahead of
its practical possibilities and never got a trial, as the
"Experimental Armored Force" was disbanded in 1929.
For Britain, the demise of the Force marked the beginning of
a turning point in the development of both doctrine and strategy.
In the following ten years the War Office would literally turn a
deaf ear to, among others. Fuller, Hobart, Martel, and Colonels
C. Broad and G. Pile of the Royal Artillery advocating the
development of an armored division and continued to believe in
obsolete concepts. In a way, mechanization had progressed as
far as it possibly could have in an army based on 18th and 19th
century mentality. The British regimental system, limited to the
infantry and cavalry, had ceased to be a functional organization
with the mechanization of warfare, especially in combined arms
operation. But the regiment, where the true loyalty and pride of
the British soldier was centered, was a tremendously influential
entity and, in the 1930's, it was too early to try to superimpose
a corporate spirit, as required for mutually supportive arms in a
modern Blitzkrieg. Yet that was a step necessary for the success
of a divisional organization.
The technical branches such as the artillery and the
engineers, however, generally were more oriented towards their
arm than towards their assigned unit and were already organized
for and indoctrinated to a support role. In the case of the
engineers, this can be attributed to the fact that their command
and control was centralized in the Commander Royal Engineers
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(CRE), who was responsible for the general direction and control
of engineering tasks throughout the entire division. This
organization encouraged a perspective for engineering matters
which reached beyond the regimental level which made this service
arm quite ready for change. A similar system existed for the
divisional artillery. Thus, the promoters of mechanization came
mostly from these arms. Unfortunately, the army leadership was
dominated by cavalry and infantry which, understandably, despised
the growing infringement of the technical arms on their
traditional superiority. Moreover, after World War I, few at the
strategic helm believed another major war was possible and, by
the 1930's, the British army had reverted back to its traditional
role of the colonial police force, a mission that could easily be
accomplished without mechanization, especially when the economy
was paralyzed by inflation and depression.
It took the Munich Crisis of 1938 to free the army from 20
years of military decadence, but by then it was too late. The
following correspondence from General Squires, 29 the Director of
Staff Duties, reflects the official view of tank employment as
late as 1937 (the Tank Corps had permanently been reestablished
in 1933 under the command of Hobart) and resembles actual
operations in Belgium and France in 1940:
I. The Mobile Division (excluding the Tank Brigade)
has the task of protecting the Main Field Force when on
the move and medium reconnaissance at all times. It
would thus find itself between the Main Force and the
enemy until the battle front was formed at which moment
it would be withdrawn.
This was nothing more than the reshaping of the old role of the
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horsed cavalry screening function, except that now they were
mounted in light tanks (most light and medium tank formations
were to be established by redesignating horse cavalry as
mechanized cavalry and by issuing them tanks)
.
II. The Tank Brigade (kept seperate from the Mobile
Division) would have the task of striking a heavy blow
at an opportune moment, exploiting success or carrying
out deep raids, because the increased power of anti-
tank weapons was all the time whittling away the power
of tank formations, the chances of the Tank Brigade
prosecuting its role successfully are getting more
remote with passage of time.
It was a doctrine of again making the heavy tank an auxiliary to
infantry based operations. These official views of light and
heavy tank employment were exactly the same as those the French
were espousing, if not for identical reasons. They were not in
the Blitzkrieg tradition.
French Development of Mechanized Warfare
France emerged victorious but completely shell-shocked from
the World War. 30 The casualty lists produced by General Nivelle
and others with their "attack always attack" policy had created
an offence-phobia. This, combined with the fact that the heroism
of Verdun represented almost the only glorious exploit to reflect
on, caused the French to develop a "worship of the defence"
mentality. Petain, made Marshal of France in 1919 after his
victory at Verdun, carried the Higher War Council along with this
mood by endorsing a purely defensive policy which enhanced his
prestige but also dealt the death blow to mechanization. His
influence became colossal and prevaded even over his disciple
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Weygand who was handed the leadership of the Army in 1930. In
1935, the hero of the Battle of the Marne, General Gamelin, took
over. He, like his predecessors, fraternized the mood by
supporting the tactics which had gained him fame some 20 years
before. Thus, throughout the inter-war years the defensive
methods of 1918 became the cornerstone of the French doctrine.
In 1921, Petain reflects this attitude clearly: "Tanks assist the
advance of the infantry by breaking static obstacles and active
resistance put up by the enemy."31
The French strategy would go on the offensive only after the
enemy had been stopped before formidable static defensive
systems. In the counter-attack the heavy artillery would
function as the vanquishing force and the tank supported infantry
as the occupying force. The whole of the advance, operated at
the speed and maneuverability of muscular (man and horse) power
with its age-old dependence on road networks until the railroad
could be brought into play to supplement movement partially. The
efforts of both General Estienne and Colonel de Gaulle to bring
Fuller's concepts to practice in the French army were not only
hindered by the existing psycho logical milieu and military
traditionalism (As in the British army, mechanization was seen as
a threat to the precedence of the traditional combat branches.),
but also faced political obstacles. Since mechanization with its
reliance on highly trained technicians leaned more towards a
professional than towards a conscript armed force, an army based
on armored formation was perceived to represent a danger to the
Republic. Furthermore, static trench warfare would allow for
protection even from temporary evacuation of the Nation's
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productive means along the border with Germany.
With the start of the Maginot Line in 1929, these attitudes
were "locked in concrete" and the concept of a mobile war was
not considered thereafter. This is evidenced by Minister of War
General Maurin's statement made as late as 1935, "when we have
devoted so many efforts to building up a fortified barrier, is it
conceivable that we would be mad enough to go ahead of this
barrier into I know not what adventure?" 32 It was French anti-
militarism and apathy which ultimately harnessed the army to the
1918 concepts of warfare and caused the development of armored
operations to progress even slower than that of their British
counterpart.
!Jl£ 2i vi^sional^ En_2ineer and the All ied Potent^a^. for
Mechanized Warfare
The aversion of the leadership in both France and Britain to
the principles of the mechanized landpower advocates and to the
progressive assimilation of modern equipment and weaponry can
also be understood when considering that these nations enjoyed a
considerable military superiority over Germany until 1935, when
Hitler denounced the military clauses of the Treaty of
Versailles. In the same year, Italy invaded Abyssinia. It was
only with the emergence of German and Italian militarism that
they slowly implemented programs of rearmament and began to
consider, in earnest, the theories of mechanized warfare which
the totalitarian nations had been developing for some time.
However, these reactions, which had begun to show real progress
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only by 1938, came too late and were years behind the Germans in
research and practical experimentation. To turn around the
military decadence of 20 years in less than two years was an
impossibility for any army of this time.
When the Allies marched into World War II, they did so at a
1918 tempo, with the few existing mechanized forces tailored for
such combat. 33 Mobile formations were not only subordinated to
cavalry and infantry arms but also almost completely segregated
into either Motorized Infantry Tank divisions, with the organic
combat support or service support elements for both being mounted
in unarmored, road-bound motor transport. The Allied mobile
units thus were anything but autonomous forces, logistical ly tied
to the road networks and generally unprepared for sustained
cross-country independent operations. Mobile combined operations
were possible only along avenues supported by existing routes of
communication and when not in direct contact with the enemy,
since only the tank troops were afforded armor protection.
However, even under favorable conditions, integrated efforts were
questionable, since the units were not only unaccustomed and
untrained to function in this manner but, in addition, were
doctrinal ly unprepared. 3 ^
Conceptional ly, tank formations in the British army were to
be solitarily employed to find and defeat the enemy's armor or,
as in the French army, to support infantry operations. Motorized
infantry was utilized only to assist in consolidating deeper
armored gains until the non-motorized infantry could close on the
objective, thus allowing the over-all action to continue. To
accomplish this it was necessary for main battle tanks to be
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shielded by thick armor, making them immune to anti-tank weapons
and causing them to be very heavy. Speed was a minor
consideration with tank formations moving at the pace of the non-
motorized arms which they supported. Light, fast tanks were
employed only to screen the main combat formations in support of
independent cavalry operations; accordingly, these formations
were too vulnerable to be used in close combat. Thus, the Allies
generally developed slow, heavy tanks for combat which lacked
both the speed and the wide radius of action necessary for mobile
warfare. Infantry and combat support elements of mobile
formations lacked both the effective anti-tank capability and the
cross-country armored vehicles to allow them to act offensively
in conjunction with the tank forces, since they had not been
intended to do so.
These doctrinal deficiencies obviously affected the combat
engineer mission. Divisional engineers were generally
indoctrinated to be committed in a general support role, with the
divisional engineer staff responsible for coordinating and
planning all engineer operations, thus eliminating any close
collaboration between the combat units and the engineers sent to
support them. Such a system of control hindered the combat
engineer from acting extemporaneously to the needs of other
combat arms when actions of opportunity presented themselves,
especially on a fluid battlefield where freedom of action even at
the lowest levels of command is essential. As it was, the combat
engineers normally were employed within the division as intact,
independent companies (two or three to each divisional size
unit), and very rarely assigned missions requiring the attachment
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of combat engineer sections (platoon size elements) to
subordinate formations. 35
The engineer battalion command was more or less a staff
section which acted as the advisory, supervisory, and
coordinating agency between the divisional and engineer company
commander (s). Consequently, the engineer assets within the
division were not prepared to function together on battalion-size
missions, since there was no battalion headquarters organization
which included an organic service support/command and control
structure, required for such independent battalion operations.
This further limited the combat engineer in his capacity to
support mechanized operations, especially during assault actions
when assets beyond the company capability might be needed,* and
in delaying operations when the coordination of effort and
resources is critical. Furthermore, engineer materials and
equipment could have been located forward in anticipation of use
and more easily shifted from company to company (i.e. sector to
sector) through the coordination of an engineer battalion
headquarters with independent communications capability.
The efficiency of combat engineer management in mechanized
warfare was further debased by a lack of comprehensiveness in
integrating engineer support with the actions of the other arms
in divisional operations. Instead of being integrated, planned.
The engineer battalion headquarters (the battalion combat
engineer specialized) equipment sections are best utilized whentheir pooled assets can be provided temporarily to the line
companies for specific missions, since maintenance and repair on
unique types of vehicles is difficult, especially below thebattalion level of maintenance support.
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and, from the highest level of the staff organization and down,
engineer support in terms of mobility and counter-mobility was
almost wholly left to the initiative of the engineer staff
section, whether at the division, corps, or army level. 36
Thorough coordination and command interest through each phase of
an operation, however, was absolutely necessary, simply because
the combat engineer companies could not support operations across
the whole division front, both in width and depth, without being
programmed, and provided with time, resources, and the ongoing-
mission requirements in a timely manner which often necessitated
sacrifices in convenience of the other arms. This held true,
especially in the case of advance or withdrawal, when
communications were least efficient; the Allies relied almost
completely on wire as opposed to wireless communications. In
this case, the only means of communication from the engineer
staff section to the company was through a messenger, normally
sent to a non-affiliated headquarters in the vicinity. Both, the
lack of wireless signal and an engineer conscience staff system
left the combat engineer with ineffective management and further
encouraged impedience of action. This is attributable to the
protracted warfare which the Allied armies were prepared to wage.
The function of the Allied combat engineers on the
battlefield consisted of deliberate operations only. Heavy
artillery and tanks were to be employed in slow, methodical, and
lengthy involvements on the offensive to batter down the enemy's
field fortification, barbed wire entanglements, expedient anti-
tank defences (very few of which were anticipated), and gun
emplacements. 37 Thus, the combat engineer's energies were
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primarily reserved for maintaining routes of communication with
the forward combat units and for assisting in the construction of
more static type defensive works. With the exception of bridge
demolitions, hasty engineer operations were not considered
necessary under such conditions. The divisional engineers were
unequipped and untrained for anti-tank or blocking actions of a
fluid nature, especially in a combat environment. 38 They had
no training in landmine warfare, had no mechanical devices for
detecting or clearing such mines, and were issued only a few, if
any of these explosive charges in their basic loads of
ammunition. 39 Although other types of anti- mechanized-obstacles
such as tank ditches, abatis, road craters, and log obstacles had
been considered, training for their construction had not been
actively pursued.
Even if these aspects of combat engineer operations had been
mastered the lack of equipment would have prevented their
accomplishment. Units were furnished with either two-wheel drive
unarmored trucks or horse-drawn wagons and these over-laden
vehicles were incapable of cross-country travel and far too
vulnerable for operations in close contact with the enemy. In
addition, they had no anti-tank weapons and few machineguns to
cover their work sites, including travel to and from them. This
restricted the combat engineer's movement into those areas in
which blocking and anti-tank operations could be most effectively
Combat engineer transport generally were luxuriously inundated
with tools, devices, and stores necessary in deliberate but
excessive for hasty operations.
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accomplished in conjunction with those combat units responsible
for providing fire cover for these types of obstructions.
Consequently, engineer obstacles could not be tied into defences
unless they were constructed behind the line of contact and hours
or days in advance of use, a situation highly unlikely in
mechanized warfare.
The bridging equipment carried by the combat engineers was
also intended for the deliberate operations of protracted
warfare. The heavy tank doctrine saddled the divisional
engineers with the mission of erecting pontoon/fixed type
bridging not really compatable with mobile operations. For
example, the British army40 used the divisional Smal 1 Box-Girder
fixed bridge for light and medium tanks, and the non-divisional
Large Box-Girder fixed bridge for infantry heavy tanks to cross
gaps up to 130 feet for which floating equipment was unsuited.
River gaps greater than 130 feet could be crossed by the
divisional Folding Boat floating bridge equipment for light tanks
or the non-divisional Pontoon Boat floating bridge equipment for
medium and heavy tanks. The fixed bridge sets did not lend
themselves to rapid construction and, by 1939, the potentialities
of the floating bridges had been stretched to their limits due to
the gradual increase in vehicle weights. The result was not
entirely satisfactory, since they now could not be used on rivers
with fast currents.
This equipment was so bulky and cumbrous in design that it
made the heavy-laden two-wheel drive motor transport entirely
dependent on the road network. Thus, the only assault bridging
available had to be erected in the direct vicinity of prepared
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roadways making it a very inflexible and ineffective tool for the
support of fast-paced cross-country operations seeking surprise.
The French capability was essentia 1 ly the same with the
exception that sets were furnished as needed from non-divisional
parks at the corps and army levels. The French combat engineers
also relied on locally fabricated, wooden lattice-girder type
fixed bridges for assaults. 41 However, the lack of lateral
stiffness, of durability for repeated use, and of ease of
transport placed significant limitations of their use in
prolonged, rapid operations of maneuver.
In general, Allied bridging sets were too elaborate to lend
themselves to mass production which made them unsuitable for
employment as an expendable store. Instead, the Allies intended
to put down bridges quickly with the divisional or non-divisional
equipment and, later, replace them with semi-permanent strucures
so as to free the original bridge for future use by its owners.
However, this system was counter-productive in terms of use in
mobile operations in which many gaps may have to be crossed
within one day; the divisional engineers required the complete
reissue of sets to replace those in service. Once a bridge was
emplaced, it would be far more prudent to leave it installed
throughout an entire operation or even an entire campaign, for
that matter. As it was, the divisional engineers would be
forced to wait for the follow-on units to construct a succeeding
bridge before they could disassemble their own for use elsewhere.
This process obviously posed limitations on mobility, especially
for the main battle tank which required the heaviest, and most
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erection-time-consuming bridge sets.
Through review of the potential of the divisional engineer
one can comprehend the prevailing mentality in the Allied camp.
Chivalric values such as bravery and resolution ranked high above
any kind of scientific cleverness or expertise in the thrust for
victory. Officers planned and conducted operations, extravagant
both in time and energy and, thinking only at the pace of non-
motorized infantry, could not envision actions of maneuver
advancing more than ten or fifteen miles per day, at a time when
civilian vehicles easily travelled several hundred miles in that
amount of time. The illiberal rationale of the senior and rising
officers in a virtually 1918 military organization was unable to
correctly assimilate the principles of mechanized warfare.
Instead, official doctrines continued to be harnessed to the
concepts of an infantry dominated, positional theory of war, a
consequence felt by most other countries in Europe, since the
French army and, specifically, the French infantry division, the
backbone of the army, served as the model during the inter-war
period.
In contrast to the impasse in mechanized warfare development
of the Allies was that of the Fascist nations. Though the French
and British leaderships had basically maintained a tactical
approach to armor employment, ignoring the positions of their
unique group of mechanized landpower advocates, the German and,
to a certain extent, the Italian regimes had not. The theories
of Martel, Fuller, Liddell Hart, and others prescribing the
strategic use of armored formations, were greeted with
enthusiastic interest by the German and Italian adherents who,
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unlike their British prophets, were able to gain the needed
visibility to develop the concepts of mechanized warfare 'in
toto'. Through the realization of the Panzer Division, le
divisioni corazzale
, and the Blitzkrieg/ J,a guerra di rapido corso
(war of rapid course)
, the future axis powers picked up the torch
and carried mechanization to a more absolute reality and, thus,
their combat engineers played a different role.
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CHAPTER III
The Divisional Engineers and the Development of Blitzkrieg
Warfare in the Axis Camp from 1935 to 1940
As a result of the conversion of Germany and Italy to
Fascism, these countries were able to develop their armored
forces as offensive strategic weapons, according to the theories
of mechanized landpower, even though Italy was less successful
than her counterpart. These formations were based on combined-
arms principles, which fully incorporated the mobility and
counter-mobility function of the combat engineer to enhance unit
combat potential on the dynamic battlefield. By means of the
Blitzkrieg formula, the German combined-arms mechanized forces
overwhelmed the traditionally oriented armies of the Allies
during the first three years of World War II.
The Fascist State — The Patron of Mechanization
Some of the greatest catastrophes in military history can be
attributed to the planning of future warfare based on the outcome
of past conflicts. Effective features of past campaigns become
stratagems, regardless of contemporary capabilities, methods, and
technigues for the improvement of combat readiness. Convinced
that they have developed the recipe of victory, military leaders
allow themselves to be defeated by opponents, who employ more
modern weapons and techniques. As the winning forces, suffering
from this "victor's syndrome", are lulled into a false sense of
security, those of the vanquished or challenger are encouraged to
develop a new formula for victory. Thus, the evolution of
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warfare advances. Within this process, the development of
mechanized warfare in the form of the Blitzkrieg probably
exercised the greatest influence on warfare, since the massed
cavalry formations of the Mongol hordes.
Germany and Italy, had acomplished very little in the way of
mechanization during World War I, possessing only a handful of
tanks most of which were captured from enemy or imported from
allied nations. This contrasted greatly with the French and
British who, at the time of the Armistice, were encumbered with
huge numbers of these quasi-obsolescent war-machines and a "first
draft" doctrine for their employment, which never reached
consummation due to the War's early end in 1918 instead of 1919.
With their budgets tied up for several years supporting their
substantial tank investment, then overlapping into the 1920's
after which few governments could afford to finance large-scale
production*/ these nations easily succumbed the victor's
syndrome. All preceding mechanized development was unwittingly
directed into fixed channels by the existence of these outmoded
armored formations or this predetermined tactical and strategical
role.-'- Both Axis nations, on the other hand, had the opportunity
to conduct extensive research and development with the most up-
to-date armored vehicles before investing in major tank
construction programs, 2 especially after the late 1920's, when
competent light and medium tank designs began to appear on the
market in significant numbers.
The British and French armies use of light and medium tanks in
1940 which were developed in the mid-1920's also lends credence
to the victor's syndrome theory.
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As stated, both France and Britain had been compelled to
introduce armored vehicles before they had developed a doctrine
for their most advantageous, practical use. Here again, Italy
and Germany had benefited as late-comers in mechanization, since
both tended to develop their basic principles for strategical and
tactical armored employment before they augmented these plans
with compatable armored formations and tank designs. This
process was favored by the fact that it progressed with
consideration of the mechanized landpower theories through
experimentation during large-scale-unit maneuvers, and with the
practical experience gained in the limited warfare and military
operations of the 1930' s.
In comparing the evolution of mechanization in the Allied to
that of the Axis camp, one might simply say: "Old weapons make
old tactics and new weapons make new tactics." In the democratic
nations military development continued uninterrupted by internal
upheaval or radical political reformation. Consequently, a
tremendous rigidity and adherence to old systems and requirements
for war persisted. However, there was a revolutionary force at
work within the totalitarian nations, best termed a youthful,
spiritual force. The influence of Fascism 3 with its philosophy
of the corporate state had generated a fervent will to move
forward, by releasing the energetic forces possessed by their
ethnocentric-communities and by directing them towards an
aggressive nationalism. The Germans reflected with vengeance on
World War I , due to the Treaty of Versailles (1919), the Italians
with a certain contempt, due to the Treaty of London (1915), in
which the Italians had been promised excessive territorial
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aquisitions in the Alps and along the Adria by the Allies to
bring them into the war effort; a pledge which the final peace
settlement did not honor completely. These social and political
relationships helped to inject this new socio-dynamic vitality
with a militaristic mentality, especially by the mid-1930's, with
the advent of Naziism in Germany and with Fascist Italy's
attempts to capitalize on the prevailing uncertainties of the
European situation.
The most fundamental question to be answered when embarking
on the process of mechanization was the determination of whether
armored vehicles would be employed as tactical or strategical
weapons. If tank formations were be merely tactical aids they
could, as in the case of the Allied armies, easily be assimilated
into existing military formations. When employed as independent
strategical forces, on the other hand, a sophisticated transition
would be necessary throughout the entire armed forces. Once the
role of the tank was ascertained, more operational questions
could be resolved. First, to what branch the armored forces
would belong, second, what quantities, qualities, and types of
vehicles would be required of armored formations for the
functions assigned to them. As will be seen, the Fascist
solution was to contrast greatly with that selected by the other
governments of Europe.
The tank was a unique piece of equipment because it was
compatible with all three of the traditional branches. When
considering its ordnance alone, this armored vehicle could have
been integrated most easily into the artillery, since it could
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engage the enemy with indirect fire at a considerable range.
When considering its armored protection, it was be more effective
when used with the infantry as an anti-machine-gun device.
Finally and most significant of all, due to its mobility, which
could outpace by far the speed of unmounted troops, it was also
well suited to function as a cavalry scout or screen vehicle.
The Allies, thinking in terms of trench warfare, had adopted all
three of these assets and, as a result, limited the tank to a
subordinate tactical role. The Fascist states, however,
eventually moved beyond this three-dimensional concept of tank
employment. They were thinking in terms of eliminating the use
of trenches altogether and, accordingly, adopted a fourth
dimension, an independent tank formation capable of delivering
the decisive, dynamic offensive blow. Basically, they tailored
their mechanized forces to provide the army with such a strategic
weapon by consolidating their tanks in divisions which were
autonomous in combat of the three traditional branches. Armored
units were then given the opportunity to mature and improve their
unique capabilities without the usual interference from the non-
tank officers of the traditional branches who, in the past, had
commanded the tank units as well.
For the tank to function as a strategic weapon, it had to be
fast, durable, and accurate. Armor protection and the ability to
engage anti-personnel weapons were secondary considerations.
Thus, the tank needed to be armed with a precise, armor-piercing
main gun, instead of a loose-fire anti-personnel blasting weapon;
tanks fighting independently would engage logistical transport
or tanks in reserve, rather than fortified troops. In addition,
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armored vehicles needed to be light to cross temporary bridges
available at the divisional level and primary and secondary road
bridges. Consequently, the Fascist nations eventually adopted
the most suitable design for the main battle tank, the medium
class armored vehicle with a high-velocity anti-tank gun.
A tank formation, however cannot function in the strategic
mode without being self-sustaining. Once the armored division is
commited as an independent striking force, it cannot operate for
long, unless organic combat support and service support elements
are attached permanently and are logistical ly self-supporting.
These units also have to be equipped with armored cross-country
transport and provided with weaponry (i.e. machine and anti-tank
guns) allowing for their survival within the combat zone and
behind enemy lines when assisting combat maneuver units during
deep penetrations. This requirement contributed to the
independence of tank units from the traditional branches and
served to elevate the status of armored formations. Thus, in
order to develop mechanization as a process enhancing strategic
designs, the Fascist nations channeled it towards independent
armored organizations representing a more or less seperate branch
of service. By doing so, they were able to develop tank
organizations to their fullest potential and then incorporate the
dynamics of such a perforating force with the rest of the army.
As Liddell Hart had anticipated, it was the armored force's
great potential as a combined arms team that enabled it to
succeed. Such synthesized organizations, however, require
leaders and troops devoid of regimental, branch, or social class
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bias. Loyalty had to be directed to the accomplishment of the
team goal, other considerations being only of secondary
importance. In assimilating this type of attitude, the Fascist
mentality was far better predisposed than that of the democratic
society. The Fascist ideology replaced social prejudice with
racism. In the corporate state, nobility of birth belonged to
all members of an ethnic group, forming an "aristocracy of the
masses". Military service was not a profession, it was a part of
daily life of the armed society. 4 Militaristic education of the
youth began early in childhood and such para-military
organizations as the Hitler Youth in Germany and Young Wolves or
Bali 1 la in Italy indoctrinated future leaders or members of
society with a sense of partnership in allegiance to the state.
This perspective was further instilled in the adult through
service in the SA ( Sturmabteilung ) or the SS ( Schutzstaf fel ) , and
the Black Shirts ( Fasci di Combattimento ) or the Sabato Fascista .
Through this social militarism, the rationale of generations of
Germans and Italians were programed, although inadvertently, with
the corporate spirit so vital in combined-arms operations, and
could not help but to promote and to accomodate such functioning
within the new armored formations as they were developed.
In addition, the mechanization of warfare reguired new
leadership characteristics. Even in the strategical mode, the
campaign would be crucially influenced at the tactical level of
combat where, due to the great variety of possibilities, the
course of battle could not be forecaste. This demanded
flexibility of mind, eager acceptance of responsibility, a
combination of caution and audacity of the small unit leader and,
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above all else, the confidence and respect of the fighting troops
under his control. The Fascist, militaristic educational system
produced this type of leader 'en masse' for the first time.
Scientific soldiership replaced the traditional aversion of
officers to learning. Education had made a 180 degree turn and
now was subjugated to the army in order to enhance the military
preparedness of the nation. As Mussolini himself proclaimed:
"Military training forms generations which obey, not because they
are ordered but that fight because it is their desire." This
social militarism slowly helped to make the armed forces nothing
more than a pure instrument of the state executive, at the
complete expense of the old military elite.
As the transition was made from an army of a professional
elite to an armed society, the dictators who controlled the money
strings began playing an absolute part in war planning.
Eventually, both Hitler and Mussolini eagerly interfered in the
management of the armed forces and were just as keen at securing
the most up-to-date weapons and at applying modern concepts.
Unfortunately for them, the persistent Fascist anti-
intellectual ism of their regimes hampered the most efficient
research of development of these factors. If the planning and
production of modern war machines had been a little more
proficient, the Axis would have been much further ahead in
mechanization than they were at the begining of the War.
Nevertheless, the affinity of the Fascist nations for
mechanization was fundamental to the development of independent
armored formations and to the concept of the Blitzkrieg type
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campaign. Mechanized warfare, by the latter 1930's, was being
fitted like a gauntlet on the fist of Fascism. It was to deliver
the armored punch which, when directed at the vitals of an enemy,
was intended to administer the death blow.
Italian Development of Strategic Mechanized Warfare —
La Guerradi Rapido Corso
Initially, as in the other armed forces in Europe,
modernization and mechanization within the Italian army faced the
resistance and age-old prejudice of the officer elites who had
clung fast to the methology of traditional strategy and tactics. 5
This conservatism was based on defensive warfare and the axiom
that the infantry was the fundamental constituent of the army.
However, circumstances of a quite different nature from those
experienced by the other European powers led to this perception.
Since Italy historically had been the battleground of
foreign armies competing for its control, strategy habitually
overemphasized defense against such invasions. Due to its
topographical location with the country almost completely
protected by mountains on the mainland (and to the lack of
finaces which had plagued the young nation since its inception in
1870), the army was organized for alpine defence along the
traditional avenues of penetration. The Alpini (mountain troops)
and the Bergsaqlieri (light infantry — sharpshooters) dominated
the army and because of their distinguished past, these branches
eventually were viewed as the military elite. 6 Although the
cavalry, with no less prestige, normally was used in conjunction
with these infantry formation to block any successful enemy
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penetration, the lack of open terrain limited them in reality to
a strategic reserve function.
The First World War did not alter this concept. In fact, it
seemed to strengthen the Italian belief in the infantry/cavalry
combination, especially after the victory of Vittorio Veneto. 7
During this offensive, the Austro-Hungarian army evaporated, more
due to the collapse of the Hapsburg monarchy than to Italian
military prowess, and was forced into total rout. The cavalry
was used extensively in the offensive pursuit, victoriously
capturing Trento, Trieste, and many other cities as the advance
continued, while facing little opposition. As a result, the
vulnerability of the cavalry was obscured, and the Italian
General Staff remained convinced of its offensive potential
throughout most of the inter-war years. The prevalence of this
attitude proved to be beneficial during the development of
Italian mechanization, however, since the tank, as an aid to
cavalry operations, was considered seriously in terms of a
strategic offensive weapon. The armored vehicle could reach its
full potential only when employed to support offensive warfare, a
stratagem which the Italian General Staff eventually realized.
Unfortunately, years passed until this manifestation gained
acceptance, and throughout the 1920's and early 1930's the tank
continued to be programmed as an infantry assault support
vehicle. As with the cavalry, the lack of good terrain on the
defended frontiers restricted the feasability of using armored
formations other than as a strategic reserve. Therefore, during
this period, the few tanks available were organized in company or
battalion size support units designed to reinforce infantry
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formations in their attack of fixed positions. 8 Due to the
restrictions placed on tank design by the mountainous terrain,
the Italians produced only light tanks armed with machine guns,
which were suited best for narrow roads and steep inclines.
During the 1920's, only 125 of these tanks were produced,
demonstrating that the tank had been firmly established within
the army, but that the temporizing finacial commitment still had
left great latitude for future development.
By the mid-1930's, this situation began to change rapidly.
The fascist regime increased its efforts to infuse the Italian
people with a bellicose, martial spirit while, at the same time,
inaugurating an aggressive and imperialistic foreign policy. As
Italy prepared for war, the Army General Staff, in part due to
the spread of Fascist influence within the military forces,
commenced with the development of a stratagem, which stressed the
primacy of offensive, in accordance with the nation's new found
ambition. 9 Initially, the army experimented with a new kind of
maneuver force consisting of cavalry and Bersaglieri mounted in
armored machinegun carriers (CV 33) or on bicycles. In this way,
for the first time, tanks were incorporated as a part of a
maneuver force. These preliminary research efforts resulted in
the authorization of a program according to which one tank
squadron was to be created within each cavalry regiment, and one
battalion to be assigned to each infantry corps. 10 At this
point, a consequential step had been made in the direction of
mechanization, since the creation of of a large number of armored
formations and the production of thousands of modern light tanks
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now gave the General Staff the opportunity to incorporate these
new units into large-scale maneuvers.
The combat experience gained during the invasion of Ethiopia
and in the Spanish Civil War also was of significant importance
in the development of the Italian armored arm. 11 in these
conflicts, during the period from 1935 to 1937, the Fascist
regime over-publicized the use of armored vehicles in the hope of
impressing the world with Italian combat readiness and military
prowess. This did much to cause the Italian General Staff to
contemplate more appropriate roles for armored formations,
especially since the tank generated such great interest and, if
properly employed had the potential of earning significant
respect for the Italian army in general. In addition, the
development of the medium tank with a turret mounted machinegun
and a fixed cannon (anti-tank gun) was initiated after several
incidents had demonstrated that the standard Italian tanks with
fixed machine-guns could easily be outflanked, and lacked the
heavy weaponry to engage enemy positions and vehicles
effectively. These events, together with further experimentation
in 1937, precipitated the final creation of independent armored
divisions and a strategic doctrine for their use. At the same
time, the victory in Ethiopia welded the army and the Fascist
regime together and brought both under the absolute control of
Mussolini, thus generating the needed motivation to allow the
mechanization to continue. 1 ^
War experience also had proved the need for greater
motorization within the army. This resulted in an acceleration
of the motorization program and, at the same time, benefited the
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development of mechanization. On 1 June 1936, the Italian army
temporarily formed a motor-mechanized brigade which, on 15 July
1937, was reorganized as the Prima Brigata Corazzata (First
Armored Brigade), consisting of one tank regiment, one motorized
Bersaglieri regiment, one engineer and one anti-tank company, and
one anti-aircraft battery. During the annual grand maneuvers of
1937, the brigade was used as "an instrument of high penetrating
capacity, designed to open a breach in a solid enemy line". 13
Lessons learned during this exercise served as a basis for the
final development of armored forces in the Italian army. After-
action-reports and official military journal articles recommended
the use of tanks 'en masse 1 and in independent roles, and
emphasized the potential of the armored formations. 14 From these
suggestions and the practical knowledge gained, the General Staff
under the persistence of Mussolini began to form armored
divisions (le Di v isione Corazza le Arieto and _le Divisione
Corazza le Centauro ) and had established doctrines using B.H.
Liddell Hart's strategy, the "expanding torrent", for mechanized
warfare, appropriately labeled "War of Rapid Flow" (la Guerra di
Rapido Corso). 15
The armored divisions were planned as combined arms teams.
The mass combat power of the tank regiment was to be embodied in
the four medium-tank battalions, one battalion of heavy tanks
which was included for use against strong-points, and one light
battalion for reconnaissance. The division also boasted a
Bersag l ieri regiment of two battalions mounted in trucks, one
company of motorcycles, an artillery regiment, an anti-tank
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company, two batteries of anti-aircraft guns, and a combat
engineer company. All wheel-drive military trucks in
production, notably the Fiat Dovunque (Anywhere), were programmed
as the motor transport. Simultaneously with the creation of this
new armored division, a new manual, Impiego del le Unita Carriste
was published, which outlined the new concept of mechanized
warfare. This manual differentiated between the tasks of
infantry-support tank units and those of the independent armored
division, a maneuver force to be used against the enemy flank or
for penetration and deep exploitation of his line. 17 The general
concepts of the mechanized landpower advocates were incorporated
to a remarkable degree, with the paralysis of the enemy command
structure as the ultimate aim.
Unfortunately, Italy's productive potential was far behind
its military planning. The inadequately managed mass-productive
capability of the nation was incompatable with mechanized
warfare, since Italy lacked the natural resources, the funding,
and the technological expertise to compete with other
industrialized nations. 18 As a result, the medium-tank battalion
of the new armored forces, of which in addition to the equivalent
of five motorized divisions only three eventually were equipped
and sustained, entered the Second World War with machinegun armed
light tanks which were seven to twenty years old. It should be
This can be compared to the other industrial nations who, during
the course of the War were able to establish and continually
maintain the following divisions: United States - 16 armored and
43 motorized/mechanized infantry; Britain - 4 armored and 8
motorized/mechanized infantry; Germany (including satelite states
under occupation) - [in various states of readiness] 30 armored
and 25 motorized/mechanized infantry.
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remembered that this tank was developed for use in the Alps as
well as in open terrain. These armored vehicles were only
partially replaced just prior and during the first year of the
War, with either the 1936-38 model cannon armed Mll/39 medium
tank or the L6/40 light tank; both pieces of equipment were
obsolete before their introduction to combat. The year 1939 set
in motion a rapid acceleration in tank technology, and
production, research, and development progressively improved and
enhanced the capability of new armored vehicles. Nevertheless,
from this point, throughout the duration of War, Italy was
increasingly left behind in tank development, her efforts
producing only a trickle of outdated tanks. The anti-tank gun
and artillery capability also was weak, with most units under-
equipped with antiquated weaponry. Although the infantry and
combat support troops eventually were mounted in cross-country
vehicles, they lacked armored protection and thus could easily be
separated from the tank formations during combat, causing the
combined-arms team to break down. Consequently, the Italian
armored forces were not prepared to deal offensively with a tank-
versus-tank environment. Therefore, the artillery or the anti-
*
One can see the influence of the concept of tank employment on
tank design in all armored formations up to 1938, and after in
the infantry-support tank. The Mll/39 had a fixed cannon mounted
in the hull, allowing it to fire only to the front, while the
machinegun was mounted in the turret. This is a prime example of
the infantry-support vehicle. The main gun was designed to blast
field fortifications during the assault, while the machinegun
could be traversed to engage troops as the enemy position was
overrun. In the case of using the armored vehicle as an anti-
tank weapon, the cannon had to be mounted in the turret. This
problem was finally resolved when the Italians introduced L6/40
light tanks in 1940, and the M13/40 medium tank in 1941. These
tanks had the main armament mounted in their turrets.
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tank gun remained their only viable anti-tank weapon throughout
the War. Although the spirit of mechanization was present, the
physical ability to make it become reality was not. But even
motorization fell far behind expectations and, like in most other
European powers, horse-drawn transport remained the primary means
of conveyance for the army.
The Italian Army General Staff further compounded these
problems when in the late 1930's, in an attempt to save money and
to allow the career officer better possibilities for promotion,
an army-wide policy was established which filled the majority of
company grade officer and enlisted positions with reservists.
Consequently, the leadership at the combat unit level was
undermined. 19 in the new armored divisions, little constructive
combined arms training could be accomplished and, when the War
started in 1940, the mechanized units had scarcely been
familiarized with this new mode of warfare. Furthermore, the
Italian army never had the opportunity to practice coordination
and interoperability between mechanized, motorized, and non-
motorized elments above division level. If they had had the
chance to test the new concept against a non-mechanized opponent,
such as Germany had in Poland, many of the operational
deficiencies experienced in the early campaigns of World War II
could have been corrected previously.
As things turned out, Italy was not offered such an
advantageous tria 1 -and-error conflict, and her general poor
performance in the mechanized warfare of 1940 resulted. The army
was not given enough time to make the transition from a static
1918 military organization to the more mobile establishment
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required for warfare of dynamic maneuver. Although the Italian
army had moved ahead of the other major powers of Europe, with
the exception of Germany, and now had the armored, independent
striking force to put into practice the concepts of the
mechanized landpower advocates, the armored forces alone were
being indoctrinated for mechanized warfare. In Italy, the
infantry-support tank battalions were all grouped under a
separate administrative headquarters, and segregated from daily
contact and training with the divisions which they would join
during the War. Only in Libya were the infantry-support tank
battalions organically attached to their parent infantry division
and corps commands. But even there, they were used in their
traditional role during exercises, i.e. assigned piecemeal as
infantry assault vehicles. 20
The primary reason for the non-mechanized units in the army
being not incorporated into the grand designs for campaigns of
maneuver were as follows. First, even though the doctrine had
changed, the equipment had not. The infantry divisions were
primarily dependent on horse-drawn transport and weakly
provisioned in anti-tank weaponry, and thus could hardly support
mobile armored operations, even in a limited manner. Second, the
higher commanders, except those in the motorized/mechanized
forces, had not yet been convinced, in either the practical or
the conceptual sense, of the potential of mechanized warfare.
Before the Army General Staff could begin to resolve these
dilemmas, the War was upon them; Galeazzo Ciano, Italy's Foreign
Affairs Minister (1936-43), himself believed that Mussolini
-
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should not have formed an alliance with Germany until 1943, due
to the army' lack of readiness. Consequently, the Italian army
was hampered by a bi-conceptual view of warfare throughout most
of the conflict. Italy needed its own version of Germany's
General Guderian, a mechanized warfare systems architect who
could have welded the two divergent perceptions into a coherently
dynamic plan of operations while, at the same time, instilling
the military organization with an aggressive spirit; a
mechanized specialist with the ability to organize progressive
programs of equipment development, unit training, and logistics
efficiency throughout the armored/mobile forces, and then to
incorporate this effort as the offensive spearhead within the
army. Unfortunately for Italy, such a leader never materialized.
The Italian soldier did not lack bravery; but the mediocre
leadership and substandard arms and equipment in the Italian army
robbed him of both the confidence and the ability to wage
mechanized war. Thus, the true potential of the Italian
armored forces was never realized, which had a significant impact
on the preparedness of the Italian combat engineer to support
mechanized warfare. Nevertheless, important advances in the
techniques and methods for supporting mobility and counter-
mobility on the modern battlefield were made.
The Readiness for Mechanized Warfare of the Italian Combat
Engineer
One of the Italian army's primary functions was to provide
for the defence of the natural Alpine frontier. This mission was
of fundamental importance to the divisional engineer units, since
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mountain warfare was conducive to small-unit action. Throughout
the inter-war years, hasty methods for defensive, delaying, and
blocking operations as well as assault actions to support this
task were effectively developed by the Italian Corps of
Engineers. These were to be accomplished by small, independent
combat engineer units in conjuction with semi-autonomous Alpine,
Bersag l ieri
,
or mountain infantry regimental battalion, or
company combined-arms groups ( Raggruppamenti ) , 22 Consequently,
the Italian combat engineer not only experienced sufficient
training in hasty operations but also got significant
indoctrination to cooperate extemporaneously with front-line and
maneuver troops on limited operations in a direct support role.
Although the employment of combat engineers in this manner was an
essential requirement in mountainous terrain, this perspective of
engineer utilization was slowly established throughout the army
as it was greatly expanded in the 1930's, especially after 1935,
when the armed forces officially adopted the Fascist military
doctrine, stressing the primacy of the offensive.
The importance of these principles also lay in their easy
application to mechanized operations. Accordingly, this process
started as early as 1935, when the Italian army seriously began
to consider mobile armored/motorized operations. 23 in order to
support the mobility of friendly maneuvering forces, the
engineers quickly realized the importance of mechanizing and
motorizing divisional engineer support units. As in the Allied
nations, however, the function of the infantry-support tank units
infringed on the combat engineer mission, but not nearly to the
same extent as in these other armies. Up to the 1939-1940
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period, the Italian tanks were thinly armored machine-gun
carriers, far inferior in fire power and armored
breaching/demolishing might to the heavy infantry tanks of the
French and British armies. Thus, the Italian infantry formations
depended, to a considerable degree, on the engineers during
assault operations, for mobility in the crossing of
entanglements, tank ditches, or water obstacles, and for
assistance in the storming of fortified positions. To accomplish
these tasks, the combat engineers were equipped with
flamethrowers, bangalore torpedos, barbed wire cutters, and
demolition materials and equipment; 24 in the infantry tank units,
some tanks were modified and fitted with flamethrowers. 25 This
cooperation resulted in only partially motorized, and never
mechanized divisional engineer units.
Due to the lightness of Italian tanks, with the heaviest
weighing only eleven tons, the bridge equipment designs developed
and used in World War I were easily modified and refitted for use
by the mechanized and motorized forces during the inter-war
years. Even though this equipment, used similarly to that of the
Allied armies, was not perfectly suited for dynamic, mobile
operations, it caused the development of the ability to
accomplish rapid water and dry gap crossings as a primary
consideration of the Italian army's armored corps (Corpo d'Armata
Corrazzato )
.
This unit was located and conducted maneuvers in
the Po River valley, and remained the only real mechanized force.
This organization had reached only 80 percent strength in men and
equipment by April 1939, 26 however, and this, together with the
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lagging industrial and technological progress, prevented the
improvement of bridging equipment and methods before the War.
The rest of the army did not experience these kinds of problems
to the same extent, since its areas of operation were located
either in mountainous or desert regions, where the rapid spanning
of water obstacles was far less important, it generally was not
motorized, and it was prepared to wage a positional type of
warfare rather than one of maneuver. Consequently, bridging
assets and equipment continued to be held at the non-divisional
level, 27 and to be issued only, as in the French army, from
higher headquarters as an expendable item of equipment, a
practice which limited the mobile independence of the
mechanized/motorized division.
Counter-mobility and defensive operations also were
considered fundamental elements of modern warfare, and it was in
this area that the Italian combat engineers made their greatest
contribution. The reason for this fact lay in the great
importance of these capabilities in both static and mobile
operations, no matter where conducted, even though in the case of
the Italian army, they were tailored for mountainous or lower-
plains areas of Northern Italy. The Corps of Engineers
eventually realized that obstacles of the type used in former
wars no longer served the purpose of delaying or blocking modern
mechanized or motorized armies. Obstacles had to be placed in
depth, emplaced rapidly, and as effortless as possible in regard
to combat engineer services. 28
Efficient methods and procedures evolved mainly due to the
excellent practical training localities for counter-mobility
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obstacles provided by the mountain regions of Northern Italy. To
impede the enemy, tunnels bridges and road craters were to be
blown with demolitions or, if necessary, with landmines, to sever
rail and roadways. These obstructions were to be coordinated by
the High Command, and emplaced by the combat engineers. Their
detonation was left to judgment of the executing officer on
location, normally, the leader of the forces provided direct
anti-personnel and anti-tank cover-fire. 29 The main difference
between these procedures and those of the past was the fact that
obstacles were now produced in greater quantities and were much
more effective, and, thus, more difficult to repair or breach,
even with modern machinery and equipment. Furthermore, the
demolition of navigable canals and dams were considered, when,
there was little time to build obstacles.
The Italian counter-mobility capability was further
supplemented, when, as a result of experiences in the Spanish
Civil War, the General Staff placed a high priority on anti-tank
defence. With the expansion of armored forces in most European
armies, including their own, the Italian army now searched for
methods to supplement their weakness in anti-tank weaponry. This
need was mainly covered through the anti-tank mine which,
although not extensively used, had proved its value in Spain. 30
By 1938, the Italian combat engineers had adopted mine warfare as
one of their principal duties. Platoons designated for this task
carried 714 tripmines (anti-personnel)* and 64 pressuremines
*_Tripmines were intended for use against men and animals. They
weighed four pounds and nomally were (continued on next page)
enough to emplace a one kilometer anti-personnel
and a 120 meter anti-tank minefield, or a combination of both. 31
Through training, the combat engineer platoon could put down the
entire supply in ten to twelve hours, while providing their own
security. They then prepared sketches which pin-pointed the
location of each individual mine and submitted them to the
divisional engineer company commander (normally only one was
assigned to each division) for coordination throughout the
division or for further use in recovering the mines.
Procedures for taking up mines were limited to manual
techniques. However, tank rollers were under consideration just
before the War. 32 These were heavy steel rollers, attached to the
front and pushed ahead of a tank at a distance of about ten
meters, detonated the mines through their own weight. Tripmines
offered no special difficulty, since, when they were not used in
conjunction with anti-tank mines, they could easily be cleared
with aid of a tank or by hand. The anti-tank mines, however, did
present a significant problem, since they had to be manually
located and cleared, or destroyed by artillery fire. 33 For this
reason, the Italians were doctrinal ly prudent in providing not
too much concealment for these devices. In addition, their anti-
(continued) fixed to the pickets or shrubs at a height of eight
to twelve inches from the ground, and then concealed. A pull on
the cord to which they were attached released a striker which
fired the mine.
**_
Pressuremmes were employed for blocking roads or places likely
to be crossed by vehicles or tanks. They normally were arranged
so that at least one wheel or track of the vehicle had to pass
over at least one mine. A minimum pressure of 250 pounds caused
detonation. The mines were buried in the ground and covered
with one to one-and-onehalf inches of earth.
81
tank mines had been developed for use primarily against light
tanks similar to their own, and proved to be less effective
against well armored medium and heavy armored vehicles. Mine
warfare did, nevertheless, provide the Italian army with an
effective anti-tank capability, which all the other European
powers, except Germany, had failed to develop both doctrinal ly
and in practice. Just before the War, the Italian combat
engineers emplaced thousands of landmines to improve the defence
of Tobruk and Bardia, Italy's major Libyan ports. This
presented, together with the covering fire of the interlocking
systems of anti-tank gun/machine-gun positions and the anti-tank
ditching, a formidable obstacle, even in terrain with almost no
natural obstructions. 34
However, the combat engineer forces and their command and
control structure had not been organized and systematized
adequately to meet the demands of mechanized warfare. Thus,
these advances in counter-mobility could not be employed
effectively. From its highest levels down, combat engineer
management was inhibited by the complex planning and operational
regimen indicative of the Italian staff section, still
functioning as the central agency for static military activities.
As with the French and British commands, it was difficult to get
a concerted and coordinated effort behind combat engineer
activities. Late in 1942, Major Sillavengo, commander of the
31st Combat Sapper Battalion [Italian], despairingly described
the Italian organization for directing the affairs of engineers
as a chain of managerial control that originated in the Commando
Supremo (Italian Army, Libya) and passed through the troop
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command, the supply command, two group commands, three corps
commands, and nine divisional commands; 17 commands all together,
with five generals, eleven colonels, and at least 40 lieutenant-
colonels and majors.
Obviously, an independent engineer central headquarters was
needed, with the command influence and authority to coordinate,
manage and supervise engineer activities from the army or corps
through to the divisional command structure. In this way,
engineer support at each level of control could have been easily
integrated and correlated in the overall scheme of the maneuver,
through each phase of an operation. Such a level of combat
engineer efficiency, however, was never reached. Instead,
assigned combat engineer units were responsible for providing
liason elements to the units they supported, whether at the army,
corps, or divisional level, and had to compete with the more
influential arms (infantry, cavalry, and artillery) for staff
support and operational visibility. Since the effectiveness of
engineer activities normally necessitated both the assistance and
sacrifice of these dominating combat arms, it was only on rare
occasions that counter-mobility or defence enhancement operations
could get the comprehensive, concerted subsidization they
required. Of greater consequence, however, was the fact that
these liason sections for the divisional staff were not allotted
in the standard authorization of personnel and equipment. Thus,
the field commanders of divisional engineer units had to try to
perform the dual role of staff officer and, depending on the size
of the engineer unit assigned, company or battalion commander.
This situation resulted in the engineer effort being under-
represented and neglected, when it should have been considered a
fundamental element of divisional operations.
These problems were further complicated by an insufficient
divisional engineer organization. Those combat engineer units
supporting divisions were "mixed", i.e. normally consisted of
telegraph and radio-telephone elements. 36 in contrast with other
armed forces, a seperate Italian signal corps had not been formed
during the inter-war years so that these duties remained combat
engineer responsibilities. Thus, while the energies of the
divisional engineer could have been best utilized on the front
lines, half of the unit's efforts were diverted to laying
telephone wire or maintaining communications in the division's
rear. Even worse, the normal accompaniment of combat engineers
in the division was a mixed battalion with one company of each in
the infantry division, or a mixed company with two or three
platoons of each in the mechanized and motorized divisions. This
was far from adequate, especially when considering that most
armies had at least three unmixed companies of combat engineers
per division and, in most cases, even this number did not
suffice. In actuality, static, offensive war would have greatly
strained these organizations and they could not even have come
close to effectively supporting the division in a conflict based
on rapid maneuver.
All these aspects of the combat engineer ability to support
divisions in the field reflect the readiness of the Italian army
for mechanized warfare. In contrast to the Allied armies, the
Italian divisional engineer units had been incorporated into the
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operations of combat units and functioned in a direct-support
mode. In addition, combat engineers were indoctrinated to act in
conjunction with these supported units in a combined-arms manner
by providing engineer assistance of a hasty nature, although this
encounter-limited predisposition favored counter-mobility (i.e.
anti-tank, delaying, or blocking actions) due to the character of
the army in general. The Italian divisional engineer
potentiality resembled that of its Allied counterpart in that it
too lacked the armored cross-coutry vehicles and weaponry which
would have allowed for effective cooperation with combat units
when in contact with the enemy. This held especially true for
the mechanized/motorized units, whose mobility would have
suffered considerably, since the engineers could not move rapidly
into those areas with enemy integrated or covered obstacles with
defensive positions. The methods and equipment for bridging
obstacles likewise were unsuited for mechanized operations,
hampered by most of the limitations and deficiencies which
handicapped Allied rapid maneuverability. Furthermore, the
programming and management of combat engineer activities could
not be effectively synthesized into the overall operations of the
division, due to the lack of an assertive "Engineer Command"
structure. This resulted in a staff system which lacked the
cognizance and proficiency to rapidly, and most advantageously
incorporate the efforts of combat engineers in order to increase
the division's overall combat power, a shortcoming which was
further aggravated by the disproportion of combat engineer
assets, in both personnel and equipment, to the normal demands of
mechanized warfare.
Although the Italian army had developed combined-arms
mechanized/motorized forces, lack of time and resources prevented
the refinement and improvement of these armored divisions as an
offensive capability. Despite the fact that the Italian military
doctrine stressed the primacy of the offensive, the Italian war-
machine was not modernized to the point at which it could have
accomplished this in mechanized warfare. Neither the industrial
nor the technological processes could maintain a pace which would
have kept the army equipped and armed for the demands of modern
warfare. Thus, by June 1940, when she entered World War II,
Italy had reached an impasse in mechanized warfare development;
even though doctrinal ly she followed the blitzkrieg tradition,
her physical plant did not. This problem, however, was not
shared by Italy's ally, Germany.
German Mechanization and the Development of Blitzkrieg Warfare
As was the case in Italy, historic and geopolitical factors
did much to shape the strategic rationale in Germany. For
centuries, Central Europe had been the battleground for disputes
between powerful bordering states, in rivalry to gain absolute
control. Unfortunately, this region offered few natural obstacles
against such invasions and, as a result, preparation for military
defence evolved as a primary consideration in the politics of
Germanic states, and fostered militarism within these
societies. 37 With the unification of Germany under Prussia in
1870, the conditions inducing this psychomilieu did not change.
86
The new German empire was still surrounded by powerful
adversaries and, in the event of war, always faced with the
possibility of a two or even three front war. The only means of
victory lay in an aggressive offensive campaign, aimed at quickly
eliminating the opposing nation on one front before switching the
entire military effort to contend with the second front. 38 of
primary importance, however, was that Germany could only afford
to wage a war of short duration, since she lacked the resources
to fight a conflict of attrition. These conditions, together
with the Nazi attempts to promote German military prowess, did
more than anything else to accomodate and encourage the
development of the Blitzkrieg and armored warfare, methods which
were formulated through the amalgamation of three basic features.
During the 1860's, the Prussian General Staff, under the
guidance of General Helmut Graf von Moltke, had perfected the
planning of the Kesselschlacht * (Encirclement Battle) as a means
to achieve a quick, decisive victory; it was to be the first
element in the Blitzkrieg formula. This new concept was based on
the realization that improvements in weaponry had given the
defender the advantage in combat, that the Napoleonic tactics of
offensive concentration of fire and shock were no longer
effective. Instead, Moltke's "Regulations for the Higher Troop
Commanders" stressed a strategy in line with Liddell Hart's
"baited gambit", where, before the enemy could mobilize, fast
strategic maneuver (primarily dependent on the use of railroads)
was executed to gain key tactical terrain which offered an
"Kessel" means caldron or kettle, in a military context it is a
pocket; "Schlacht" is a battle.
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advantage to the defence while enveloping the enemy to fix him in
place and to entice him into attacking a strong Prussian position
frontal ly. By exploiting the advantages of the tactical
defensive, the Prussian forces could wear down the combat
effectiveness of the enemy before counter-attacking to destroy
him. 39 This strategy was successfully used against France in
1870 and brought about Napoleon Ill's defeat in the Battle of
Sedan. This type of campaign could be used to win a two-front
war, if the ability for rapid maneuver existed. However, the
improvement of European armies and frontier defences in the late
19th century made a repeat of a decisive German strategic stroke
increasingly more difficult.
This was realized when the German army, in attempting a
Super-Kesse l sch l acht
, failed to execute the Sch l ief f enp lan in
1914 due to the lack of a means for dynamic maneuver. As a
consequence, the war evolved into a two-front conflict of
attrition, which the Germans could not win. Nevertheless, the
war gave rise to another innovation, the second element in the
Blitzkrieg formula, which somewhat revitalized mobility on the
battlefield. Although the Germans had done very little with
tanks, they did devise new organizations, assault ( Stoss )
divisions, as a means to break the deadlock of French warfare. 40
These formations consisted of Sturmtruppen
, specially
trained infantry and combat engineers with machine-guns and light
mortars, together with flamethrowers, which were employed to
infiltrate the enemy's defences by by-passing strong-points to be
dealt with by the following main assault units, and to attack
artillery positions which, if overwhelmed, prevented the enemy's
withdrawal to new defences. In many situations, light
artillery guns were man-handled with the advance of the Stoss
formations and, together with aircraft, provided direct fire
support. It was the first case of combined-arms operations, and
these mixed teams or battle groups were successfully used on all
fronts, as demonstrated by the noteworthy German victory over the
Italians at Caporetto in November 1917, where Captain (later
Field Marshal) Erwin Rommel's command captured 9,000 prisoners
and 81 guns. 42
The Sturmtruppen could have been easily developed into even
more dynamic striking forces by incorporating tanks or armored
cars. However, the Armistice negated any prospect of such
elaboration. The facts that the Treaty of Versailles prohibited
tanks to Germany and that many high ranking officers falsely
attributed defeat in the War to these vehicles sparked a great
interest in armored vehicles in general. The military leadership
soon began to believe that the Allies had denied Germany
possessing tanks because they were the key to success on the
battlefield. Accordingly, initially the German army was forced
to think only in terms of anti-tank, which, by the 1930's, had
fostered the development of the most formidable anti-tank units
in Europe. All that was necessary then was the addition of
well-equipped and well-trained armored units, the third element
to complete the Blitzkrieg formula; and this the Germans had done
with alarming efficiency, by the end of the 1930's.
The origins of mechanized warfare development in Germany can
be found in the influence of General Hans von Seeckt who had been
89
given the task of organizing the post-war 100,000-man Reichsheer.
Under his leadership, detailed studies were accomplished to
determine the reasons for Germany's failure in the 1914
offensive, all of which showed that, if the Mo 1 tke/Sch 1 ief f en
doctrine was to be successful in modern warfare, speed and
maneuver had to be revitalized. 43 Thus, von Seeckt placed full
emphasis on improving the mobility of the German army, primarily
through the development of motorized infantry and the
motorization of the logistical system. He also advocated a
professional regular army with a greater degree of independence
from civilian reserves, which could rapidly be activated and
committed to combat before the enemy could mobilize his own
combat potential effectively. Civilian reserve units were to be
called up after hostilities had commenced and would function as
home defence forces or as reinforcements of the army already in
the field. 44
It was also during von Seeckt's tenure that programs of
study were initiated in the army service schools, to familiarize
the officer and non-commissioned officer corps with the new
combined-arms concepts and the spirit of the Stoss formation, a
measure which powerfully influenced the rationale of army leaders
after the German rearmament began in 1934, when the concept of
combat teams and methods similar to those of the Sturmtruppen
In his Truppenfuehrunq — 1933 (Troop Command), an official
statement of army doctrine, General Ludwig Beck, Chief of the
Truppenamt beginning in 1933, and then Chief of the Army General
Staff during the German military expansion (1935-1938),
sanctioned battalion-size Kampfgruppen (Combat Teams) for use by
the conventional arms (infantry, artillery) as a general rule. 4
became doctrine throughout the armed forces.*
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When Germany entered World War II, the greater part of the
military leadership had been indoctrinated with these techniques,
which demanded of them a certain independence of mind, vitalized
through a combination of energy, initiative, and opportunism,
guided by caution and audacity, and which was logically
disciplined for flexibility in the processes of decision-making.
With the incorporation of the radio, even the smallest combat
group had been emancipated etirely from the constraints of static
command and control. This independence of action allowed for
complete responsiveness to the combat situation at the lowest
levels of command and for leaders to adopt plans of operation
involving any number of these autonomous combat groups, minute by
minute, as circumstances presented themselves. When considering
the development of the Panzer division and Blitzkrieg operations
in general, these aspects became essential.
By 1929, von Seeckt's motorization program was rigging small
cars to represent tanks during official exercises, while
unofficially conducting experiments with tanks at Kazan testing
grounds on the Volga, through a secret agreement with Soviet
Russia. Small tank design cells, formed in the early 1920's
within the German industrial complex, had progressively developed
armored vehicle designs and programs for their production,
including systems improvements in optics, armarment, armor
protection, engines, transmissions, suspensions, and tracks.
Together with the input gain from the Kazan testing, a perfection
of blueprints had been realized by 1930. 46
In the same year. Major Hans Guderian was given command of
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the all-important motorized trial unit, the 3rd (Prussian) Motor
Transport Battalion. By this time, Guderian had hit upon the
general formula for mechanized warfare by combining the
Kesse l sch l acht with the combat-group concept of the Stoss
formation, and then supplementing these with the theories of both
Fuller and Liddell Hart and, in this way, had created the
Blitzkrieg. 47 He envisioned the use of a divisional
armored/motorized team, comprized of combat components from all
branches to achieve break-throughs and then exploit these
breaches by conducting deep strategic penetrations, unhindered by
the logistic limitations of the past. All constituent elements
would be equipped to maintain the same speed and cross-country
performance as the tanks, so as not to serve as an impediment to
the overall mobility and the versatility of the formation. These
penetrations would be the enveloping features of the
Kesselschlacht
.
As fate determined, Guderian was in the right place at the
right time to develop his concepts into reality, eventually. His
motorized battalion consisted of a company of dummy tanks, an
anti-tank company with wooden cannons, and two reconnaissance
companies, one mounted in armored cars and the other on
motorcycles. This unit lacked the combat engineer and field
artillery elements, and the wireless communication equipment to
make it a viable combined-arms team. 48 Nevertheless, this
dubbiously equipped trial unit practiced every type of combat
operation — attack, defence, withdrawal, flank attack, direct
attack with infantry, and cavalry co-operation with artillery and
aircraft. By 1931, through the various exercises, a catalog of
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essential requirements was compiled, which intended to the
independent Panzerwaffe (Armored Command) of Guderian's
aspirations possible. The advocates of a separate armored force
now faced the resistance of the established branches, which
feared the prospect of having their traditional roles in combat
operations modified to allow for the emergence of what they
generally viewed as a more or less upstart motorized
transportation and supply service, an organization which promoted
methods inconsistent with existing strategy and tactics. 49
Throughout 1932 and '33, the new motorized forces were still
envisioned as filling a reconnaissance role. Further German
armored development only waited for support from the government
and Guderian's superiors.
The appointment of Hitler as Chancellor in 1933 marked the
beginning of the end for old military elitist domination within
the armed forces. By 1934, Hitler had gained complete control of
the Nazi party, had assumed dictorial power of the government on
the death of President Hindenburg, and the Nazification of the
army was well underway. As a result of the efforts of Defence
Minister General von Blomberg, a Nazi sympathizer, the armed
forces were rapidly brought under the control of the Fuehrer
through such methods as requiring to wear Nazi badges on all
uniforms, promoting of Fascism within the military establishment,
and obligating all officers and enlisted men to pledge personal
allegiance to Adolf Hitler. This Hit 1 er ization of the German
armed forces was completed by the end of 1937, when the Blomberg
military regime was forced to resign and the Fuehrer himself
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assumed the duties of Defence Minister. 51 From this point on, he
was in direct command of the army.
Obviously, this process had a significant impact on the
development of mechanization in the German army. Commensurate
with the bellicose disposition of the Nazi rationale, designs had
been completed, within months of Hitler's ascension to the
chancellorship, for a new machine-gun armed light tank, the
Panzerkampfwagen (Pzkw) I and, by early 1934, Lieutenant-Colonel
Guderian's battalion had one platoon of these tanks for training.
In Febuary of that year, during Hitler's first visit to
Kummersdorf to inspect the new equipment, Guderian was able to
demonstrate to the Commander-in-Chief the basic concepts and
elements of the Panzer division and to elaborate on the need for
a separate Panzer Command. 52 It was this visibility, together
with support from General von Blumberg and other high ranking
mechanized landpower advocates, and the fact that Guderian's
concepts conformed with General von Seeckt's theories for
revitalizing the Kesselschlacht that finally lead to the creation
of the Panzertruppe as a distinct specialty by the summer of
1934. During four weeks of special maneuvers in August 1935
under the Panzertruppe 's Chief of Staff, Colonel Guderian,
further experimentation with a battalion of Pzkw I's, together
with bits and pieces of other arms, clearly showed the viability
of the armored combat team. At this point, Nazi megalomania, now
exerting a significant influence over army policy, enabled
Guderian's ideas finally to take concrete form by the end of the
year. With the realization that the French army had created the
first light mechanized division (division legere mecanique ) , the
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German General Staff scrambled to assist the Panzertruppe in
putting three such formations together as part of the general
program to enlarge the army. Thus, the Panzerwaffe was
officially established as a seperate branch of service with
Guderian as Commander of the 2nd Panzer division, close to its
helm with the influence of a general officer.
Guderian's main concern at this point was the further
development of the Panzer division along the conceptual lines of
the Stoss formation, with a strategic as well as a tactical
capability, while simultaneously indeavoring to incorporate this
new armored formation as the offensive spearhead of the army.
Even in its inceptive phase, Guderian's Panzer division had been
tailored as a dynamically mobile combined-arms organization. It
was centered on a tank brigade supported by a motorized infantry
brigade, a motorized artillery regiment, a motorized combat
engineer battalion, and other motorized arms and services. The
division also contained an armored-car battalion and motorcycle
troops to function in the reconnaissance role.^ Therefore,
equipage rather than organization was the vital interest at hand.
The fact that Guderian, as a division commander, was somewhat
removed from the hub of the process for Panzerwaffe policy-making
and programing mattered very little, since his ideas on the
proper equipment, organization, and training for Panzer forces
had been blueprinted and only waited for his successors on the
staff to implement them, but now he possessed enough authority to
see his plans through to consummation. The most consequential of
Guderian's schemes was the program for the development and
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production of combat effective vehicles, since this represented
the area of greatest deficiencies in the Panzer division of 1935,
which then was equipped only with the Pzkw I machine gun carriers
and trucks. As the Chief of Staff of the Panzertruppe , Guderian
had intended from the very beginning of his planning to provide
the greatest versatility for armored forces by advocating various
tanks, all with a turret mounted cannon* for Panzer units, and
cross-country vehicles, both armored and unarmored, for support
elements
.
Restricted by the weight limit of 24 tons, necessary to
enable the combat engineers to provide rapid assault bridging,
Guderian developed specifications for three types of tanks, which
he considered essential for the combined-arms Panzer division:**
the Pzkw II, a light tank for reconnaissance, armed with a 20mm
gun, the Pzkw III, a medium battle tank for tank-versus-tank
combat, armed with an accurate 50mm gun, and the Pzkw IV, a
medium battle tank for the support of infantry assaults, armed
with an inaccurate 75mm gun. 55 All these armored vehicles were
under 19 tons in weight and could cruise at top speeds of at
least 40 kmph. In addition, each tank had its own wireless
communications set, commanders' tanks were equipped with two-way
radios, enabling them to receive orders and pass them on
The Krupp works had already determined the basic principle of
armament and turret design for tanks by 1926; the designs of the
main guns used in the 1939-41 period were perfected by 1933. 54
As will be explained later, 24 tons was the greatest capacity
assault bridging which could be developed at this time to
effectively support mobile operations. The German Corps of
Engineers was doing this with the introduction of the (Type B)
pontoon trestle and the (Type K) box-grinder bridges in the mid-
to-late 1930's.
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rapidly. 56 All tanks were designed for adaptation to future
demands, even though such requirements could not be ascertained
in advance. Furthermore, Guderian greatly concerned himself with
designs providing both comfort and convenience for the tank
crews. 57 The combat stationing was arranged so that crews could
cooperate effectively when in combat; an elaborate torsion bar
suspension system provided for comfort and, more importantly, for
improved performance in rapid cross-country, rough terrain
travel
.
Many of the features of the tank design also were fashioned
into the plans for cross-country vehicles, especially in terms of
suspension and communications. 58 To meet the stipulations of the
combined-arms mission, a family of armored wheeled vehicles,
Panzerspaehwagen (Pzsw) , and one of half-tracked transport,
Zugkraftwagen (Sd. Kfz), were developed, and the vehicle types
altered to suit the particular needs of each service most
effectively (i.e. signals, reconnaissance engineer, anti-tank,
anti-aircraft, field artillery, supply, or maintenance/repair).
Some types of Zugkraftwagen were adapted as armored personnel
carriers by providing them with a sloped armored plate all around
to deflect hits. The Zugkraftwagen and Panzerspaehwagen did
much to transform the fighting quality of the armored forces by
transporting the infantry and support arms alongside the tanks,
thus improving combined-arms operations. Another significant
aspect of Panzer division vehicles was that all these vehicle
families possessed interchangable parts, making divisional repair
and maintenance very easy; if necessary, cannibal ization could be
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reverted to in keeping vehicle fleets operational.
Throughout the period of 1934-36, while closely scrutinizing
tank development in other countries, the German industrial design
cells incorporated the majority of Guderian's requirements,* and
finalized designs and specifications on the Panzer division
vehicle fleets, with prototypes being in the final development
and testing stage. 59 Unfortunately, Germany lacked the
industrial capacity to equip three armored division, each
requiring 3,000 vehicles, within such a short period of time.
Furthermore, with the rapid expansion of the army, the other
services were submitting demands for their share of the new
vehicles. Thus, the new armored forces had to live with the
prospect of operating, at least for a few more years, with the
easily manufactured Pzkw I and II models and ordinary trucks.
The massive shake-out of senior officers in late 1937 and
early 1938, led to Guderian's promotion to lieutenant-general
and, in Febuary 1938, to his appointment to command the world's
first armored corps, which included all Panzer divisions in the
German army existing at that time. Within a year, his XVI Panzer
Corps participated in the Austrian Ansch l uss action and in the
occupation of the Sudeten land. These limited operations were of
primary importance, since they brought weaknesses to the surface
in the supply of services and in maintenance and repair
responsiveness. 60 During these road marches, the armored columns
The only important modification to Guderian's original proposals
was that radios were provided only down to the platoon leader
level of command and control, that a 37mm cannon was mounted in
the Pzkw III, and that the allocation of Zugkraftwagen fell below
expectations
.
suffered a 30 to 35 percent breakdown rate, and had to commandeer
fuel trucks or refuel from road side service stations in order to
maintain their advance. Based on these experiences, Guderian
integrated a greater portion of supply and service elements into
his divisions and improved methods for tank recovery and repair.
Now, the Panzer divisions carried a large enough provision of
fuel, food, and ammunition to sustain itself for five days, and
with an augmentation of three fully trained mobile workshops, two
equipped with 12 ton and one with 24 ton recovery /repair
Zugkraftwagen
, the division now was, maintenance-wise, almost
completely self-sufficient. Thus, by late 1938, the new Panzer
divisions had ironed out their internal flaws and further
improvement could only be reached through combat experience.
By September 1939, just before the outbreak of the War, the
German army had expanded its mobile forces to seven Panzer
divisions, five motorized infantry divisions, and four armored
cavalry "light" divisions, with the newer formations abundantly
equipped with tanks, trucks, artillery, and small arms which had
recently been assimilated into the Wehrmacht with the disbandment
of the Austrian and Czechos lovakian armies in 1938 and 1939.
All-told, the army possessed some 3,000 tanks, the majority of
which were Pzkw I, II, and 38 (Czech.) light tanks, and very few
armored Zugkraftwagen
. However, a reinforcment of the new medium
tanks, 100 Pzkw Ill's and 200 Pzkw IV's, arrived on the eve of
World War 11.61 with tnese additional tank formations, being
patterned after those in the XVIth Panzer Corps, Germany's
armored forced were ready for a trial
-and-error conflict to test
their innovative concepts and techniques in conjunction and
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coordination with the rest of the army, the majority of which was
not mechanized. The invasion of Poland provided such an
opportunity by serving as the proving-grounds for the Blitzkrieg
concept.
Poland offered the perfect situation for Germany to execute
the Kesselschlacht
. Mobilization was based on the old Nation-in-
Arms concept in the Polish army. Thus, it took two to three weeks
to reach combat manning. This, together with the fact that most
of the Polish assembly areas were located along the German
border, invited a double envelopment, since the German army
geographically outflanked these areas due to the deployment
advantages in East Prussia and Czechoslovakia. 63 Consequently,
the German plan called for bringing a regular Polish army to
battle near the German frontier where the Wehrmacht could fight
within easy distance of its railheads in Silesia and Pomerania.
To accomplish this, most of the Panzer, motorized, and infantry
divisions of the Active Army were employed to pin down the main
Polish forces west of the Vistula river. The rest of the army,
in conjunction with the reserve infantry divisions, could then
close the trap by marching to envelop and then annihilate any
encircled enemy units trying to escape. 64
The effectiveness of this strategy was far more successful
than the German High Command had anticipated themselves. Within
18 days, the Kesse l sch l acht had destroyed the Polish army. The
swiftness of this collapse could be primarily attributed to three
When Germany invaded Poland, out of a total of 106 divisions in
the German army, 90 were dependent, in varying degrees, on
railroads and horse-drawn transport for strategic movement."
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Panzer and three motorized infantry divisions, which eventually
were moved to spearhead the enveloping pincers. Initially, the
main effort was made by Guderian's old command, XVIth Panzer
Corps, striking northeast from Silesia towards Warsaw. At the
same time, Guderian's new XIX Panzer Corps, consisting of one
Panzer and two motorized infantry divisions, battled its way
across the Polish corridor and then, with the attachment of
another Panzer division, independently moved across East Prussia
to blitz its way southeast to Brest-Litovsk. Here contact was
made with XXII Panzer Corps of Army Group South, which was
driving northeast from Slovakia. 65
The campaign in Poland confirmed the premise that armored
formations could spearhead the breakthrough. It was no longer
necessary that an old type setpiece assault create a gap for
armored formations to exploit. A properly organized
mechanized/motorized spearhead, operating independently and
dashing forward, far in advance of the infantry formations, had
returned mobility to war. More important, the armored double
pincer that closed on Brest-Litovsk had demonstrated to Hitler
and other senior officers the potency of the combined-arms
mechanized formation and its essentiality for the successful
execution of the Kesselschlacht operation for the first time. 66
The Blitzkrieg formula was now complete. The Panzer and
motorized infantry divisions had been combat tested and fully
indoctrinated for mechanized warfare. At the same time, the
German General Staff now possessed the basic cognizance to
effectively employ these innovative formations in conjunction
101
with conventional forces. With the reinforcement of more medium
tanks, and both armored and unarmored Zugkraftwagen during the
break in hostilities provided by the "Phoney War", the Panzer
divisions represented the most formidable mechanized formation in
the world. It was only a matter of time before instinct and the
process of cogitation would lead German military planners to
devise the right combination and employment of forces to defeat
the Allies on the Western Front with the same methods used in
Poland. This operation was be bolder and grander in design and
made the "sickle cut" through France the real debut of the
Blitzkrieg, a performance which owed its success to the Polish
rehearsal. As will be seen, this tested version of the
Blitzkrieg formula optimally incorporated the combat engineer as
a fundamental provider of the dynamics characteristic of rapid
armored operations. He was an essential part of the combined-
arms team.
Blitzkrieg Pioneers — The Part Played by the German
Divisional (Stoss) Engineers in Mechanized Warfare
The First World War left the small German engineer and
pioneer corps with several lessons learned, all of which would
significantly influence the development of the divisional combat
engineer role in mechanized warfare. Recommendations for an
effective engineer staff system at both the corps and the
divisional levels, and for the introduction of assault bridging
were acted upon and later incorporated as important improvements
in the new 100,000-man Reichsheer. Perhaps the most eventful
realization, however, was that the combat engineer could serve
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the army most effectively in the direct support mode. As equal
members of the Sturmtruppen or through their participation in
front-line defensive operations, the engineers had reinstated
themselves as glorified infantry. From this point on, the chief
aim of the divisional engineer was to cooperate extemporaneously
with the front-line and maneuver units through the provision of
effective hasty support. 67 By pursuing this goal, the engineer
became an essential part of the Blitzkrieg formula.
Due to the modest size of post-war army and its lack of
offensive weapons, the German engineers concerned themselves
primarily with counter-mobility and defensive capabilities
throughout the 1920's. In fact, the official basis for improving
blocking, delaying, and anti-tank methods was the hope that they
would serve as counter-measures to the development of armored and
motorized formations in other armies. 68 British experimentation
with independent massed tank formations in the late 1920's and
early 1930's further prompted the German pioneer corps to perfect
mobile anti-tank systems. Consequently, the combat engineers, in
conjunction with the other arms (primarily anti-tank artillery
and infantry), exhibited the most formidable counter-mobility and
anti-tank potential in Europe.
In devising techniques and measures for this purpose, the
combat engineers fully realized that the most important aim
behind their missions was to rob the enemy of both speed and
mobility, the primary advantages of mechanized/motorized units.
Initially, concepts were based on positional type obstacles such
as tank ditches and iron or concrete pyramids, high enough to
prevent tanks from passing over them. These were quickly
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abandoned, however, in favor of systems better suited for mobile
operations. 69 Since the increase of mechanized/motorized forces
in other armies necessitated more rapid means for blocking,
methods for creating abatis by felling trees, blasting of road
craters, demolishing bridges, and constructing simple log
obstructions were streamlined and standardized.
To accomplish these tasks, new equipment in the form of
mechanical tools, all of which were of light weight, quick to
assemble, reliable in service, and insensitive to weather, were
intoduced. 70 Portable motor chain-saws provided greater
flexibility in abatis obstacles and anti-tank log construction,
since they had their own, built-in power source and, thus, could
be moved easily. Trailer-mounted, light-weight air compressors
with pneumatic drives for boring, hammering, and pile driving
enhanced tasks such as drilling holes for road crater (even in
hard surfaced roadways), digging of hasty field fortifications,
and emplacing log anti-tank obstacles. In addition, standard
military demolition charges were developed 71 (Ladungen or
Kilol adungen ) in sizes of one, two, three, or 25 kilograms,
specially wrapped in waxed paper or packed in tin boxes, and
made insensitive to friction, heat, and penetration by bullets or
shrapnel. (In comparison, the French and British commercial
gelignite was highly sensitive and liable to detonate. It also
melted when exposed to the heat. 72 ) All these assets, located
either in the company headquarters' power tool section or the
supply section, were allocated and issued on request to the
divisional engineer establishment to increase his productivity in
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the support of counter-mobility.
To counter-balance the army's weakness in tanks, the German
engineers improved their landmining systems and techniques,
introduced in World War I. Two types of mines were utilized, the
"S-mine" (S, for Shrapnel for anti-personnel, also called "silent
soldier") and the "T-mine" (T, for Tel
l
er ) , for anti-tank
purposes. 73 Normally, these devices were laid in a chessboard
pattern in "lines", "zones", or "fields", as dictated by the
situation, at a density of about three mines per square meter.
Combat engineer battalions in infantry divisions carried 6,000
mines in their basic ammunition load, enough to cover a front of
two kilometers at a density of 3:1. 74 Once the company survey
detachment had laid out the boundaries of the areas to be mined,
and marked reference points, a platoon of combat engineers could
emplant or conceal up to 1,000 mines per day, with the help of
battery-lighted tapes or a mine-measuring wire (M inenmess-
75draht). J Then, an accurate plan, detailing the exact location
of each type of mine, was prepared and submitted through the
company to higher headquarters. Due to its portability (because
logistics and transport were properly managed), its overall ease
of employment, and its lethality, the landmine eventually became
the German combat engineer's primary means for supporting
counter-mobility, anti-tank defence, and denial operations.
All of these artificial obstructions adopted by the German
combat engineers shared a remarkable and equatible resemblance
with those fashioned by J.F.C. Fuller for mechanized warfare.
German barrier /anti-mechanized tactics likewise followed very
much the designs realized by Fuller. 76 Basically, obstacles
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planned for the defence, and/or especially for withdrawal
operations, were characterized as either obstacles immediately in
front of a line of resistance (priority I) or as those covering
the gaps between such lines (priority II). Priority I system
obstacles were prepared to produce their full effect before the
retirement of the defending force began. In this case,
minefields were emplaced, and abatis, bridges, and road craters
rigged for demolition and placed under the interlocking
protective fires of the weapons in the line of resistance. After
the passage of the friendly rear-guard forces, these targets were
executed and gaps in mined areas closed. Priority II systems
were intended primarily to supplement artillery fire, and
emplaced in areas where direct or indirect fire could provide
little advantage. These included locations in which the enemy
could gain cover and concealment, and in which soil conditions
negated the lethal effects of artillery fire. Schematics for the
programming of obstacles were based on providing protection
against mechanized units by forcing them to shift the direction
of their attack into other sectors. The momentum of the enemy's
offensive could then be blunted or slowed, since the channelizing
of his mobile forces ultimately placed them in areas where the
defensive anti-tank and anti-personnel fires were most effective,
or where, in their retarded state, enemy key combat vehicles
(tanks) could be effectively engaged. Once the enemy maneuver
forces were contained and weakened, the friendly maneuver forces
could counter-attack to annihilate him. This is another example
of the Kesse l sch l acht , which could be applied to any level of
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tactical combat, especially once the Panzer units were integrated
into the army as an offensive weapon.
The rapidity of maneuver and actions on the modern
battlefield obviously made counter-mobility techniques of this
kind complex and much more difficult as armies began to create
massed mechanized forces. The need for the closest possible
coordination and cooperation between all arms was essential, and
in this aspect of mechanized warfare, the German army became, due
to its combined-arms character, a master. 77 Realizing that, in
actuality, the combat engineer could never be organized and
equipped to conduct defensive or blocking operations
independently, the German doctrine pertaining to counter-
mobility, elaborated on the need of supplementation by the other
arms, as early as 1937-38. Divisional mixed formations, called
blocking detachments ( Sperrtruppen ) , were constituted which, in
addition to the central body of motorized engineers, included
motor-cyclists, motorized machine-gun units, motorized anti-tank
companies, and tank-reconnaissance elements. In some instances,
field artillery and/or anti-aircraft artillery were also
provided. 79 since the combat engineer was the expert,
leadership, in most cases, was entrusted to the senior pioneer
commander from the divisional engineer battalion, who was
provided with both staff and ample means of signal (preferably
wireless) communications. 78 Once established, the Sperrtruppe
generally acted as an independent organization.
Because of the enhanced mobility of mechanized/motorized
forces, flanks could easily be turned unless friendly blocking
systems and defending forces were employed in breadth as well as
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in depth, with the best localities for obstacles in areas where
motor transport could not move off the road to by-pass, and where
existing terrain provided natural obstacles which only needed to
be reinforced with hasty barriers to impede mechanized mobility.
To surprise the enemy with these obstacles, they were erected in
areas or localities which made their early detection or
anticipation unlikely. The various obstructions ( Sperren ) were
then tied together as .a system by emplacing intermediary,
supplemental sector type barriers which, if properly situated,
forced the enemy to dismount from his vehicle to defeat the
forces covering the blocking positions and to remove the
obstacles. The fundamental principle in these types of counter-
mobility operations rested, consequently, with the quality and
quantity of the Sperrtruppe covering formations.
In general terms, the German concepts for covering fire over
natural and man-made obstacles stressed the need for employing
direct fire weapons which could effectively engage those types of
forces against which they were directed (i.e. anti-tank gun
covered anti-tank minefields or unfordable rivers). Furthermore,
anti-personnel weapons were always required to achieve minimum
protection of the obstacle against an enemy dismounted break-
through. These are a cardinal principles in light of the fact
that operations which could be executed within several hours such
as restoring an old bridge or constructing a new one over a smal 1
water obstacle (20-30 meters wide), clearing a small abatis of 25
trees, or clearing a 10 meter wide gap in an average minefield
(25 meters in depth) could be prolonged to last days or even
10E
weeks when under enemy fire. The German method for adding depth
to the defensive or delaying mission was to establish successive
belts or lines, consisting of interacting obstacles
(Sperrlinien ) , allowing for several secondary defensive lines of
resistance which could be fallen back upon, when the existing one
was breached.
In order to prepare, coordinate, and manage these complex
barrier plans, especially logistical matters, special engineer
staffs evolved at the corps and army level of command and
control. 81 These engineer general staff sections, the
Pionierfuehrungsstab or Pionierkommando
, formed an independent
division of the headquarters it served and enjoyed an equal level
of jurisdiction and esteem as any other major staff section (eg.
G-l, G-2, G-3, or G-4). This differed greatly from all other
armies, which normally subordinated their engineer staff or
liason sections to the traditional divisions of staff, a
situation which robbed the combat engineer of the needed
authority to most effectively influence operations. Responsible
for directing all efforts of the engineers within its command,
the Pionierfuehrungsstab consisted, in most cases, of a colonel
as Chief Engineer ( Pionierfuehrer ) , one major, one lieutenant,
and two lieutenants as assistants, two geologists, and twelve
non-commissioned officers, draftsmen, typists, and orderlies. 82
The engineer staff served as a focal point at the top of the
command and control structure, where the operational formulation,
sustention, and coordination were most effective. Thus,
requirements in time, resources, and combat assets for engineer
related matters could be anticipated and rapidly programmed
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throughout each phase of the planning process.
The fact that all other arms suffered inconvenience or even
disadvantage mattered very little in a headquarters organized to
incorporate the full potential of the combat engineer to meet the
demands of mechanized warfare. In this way, any type of combat
engineer operation requiring a divisional corporate effort could
receive the comprehensive and concerted subsidization needed. In
addition, because the engineer concerns gathered so much
attention at the high levels of command, familiarity with his
operations spread downwards throughout the division. Since now
all participants knew exactly how combined-arms battle drills
were to be carried out and realized the responsibilities of each
congruent arm, the combat engineer was required to organize and
train units for mobile combat-team actions.
One Pionierbat ail Ion (combat engineer battalion) was
assigned to every infantry division. This engineer organization
had no "non-combat specialist" engineer units such as utility
works, maintenance, repair, or construction duties, but was
partially motorized, and was trained primarily for hasty engineer
operations. 83 Under the battalion headquarters was an
intercommunication section and three field companies (two on foot
with horsedrawn transport); these companies represented the only
units which were not fully motorized in the battalion, but
important company supplements such as its headquarters section
and those in each of its three platoons, the power tool section,
and the baggage and supply columns were. In addition, the
battalion headquarters contolled a bridging column (carrying
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pontoon and trestle sets with outboard motors and motor boats)
and supply/stores sections. These sections carried explosives,
mines, and light technical stores and tools. Enough radio
equipment existed in a battalion to establish a system of
wireless communications to all these subordinate elements. The
divisional combat engineer's exercises and maneuvers placed a
high priority on infantry training, which was organized around
small schemes intended to provide junior leaders with valuable
experience in independent unit leadership and, at the same time,
foster a sense of teamwork between the engineers and the
formations they supported. In addition, the combat engineer
platoons and squads were drilled in demolitions, mine warfare,
and other types of hasty obstacles characteristic of blocking
operations. To support the survivability of the combat engineer
in such a mode of operation, each company was provided with light
and heavy machine-guns and anti-tank weapons. In general, combat
engineer units were indoctrinated to move rapidly, to defend
themselves, if necessary, and to break up efficiently and operate
as sub-units or to reconcentrate when required, in order to
create belts of hasty obstacles (in conjunction with front-line
units) by using the advantage of their increased mobility to
extend these belts over the widest front possible.
With the rapid expansion of the armed forces and the
creation of the Panzerwaffe in the mid-1930's, the German army
could, once again, seriously consider means of improving their
defensive potential. Accordingly, the combat engineers were
expected to serve this aggressive stratagem with new, innovative
ways enhancing mobility. The slogan "Pioniere nach vorn"
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(engineers to the front) became even more important. The two
most significant developments during the period immediately prior
to the War were the creation of the Panzerpionier (mechanized
combat engineer) battalions and the improvement of techniques in
the assault and reduction of both man-made and natural obstacles.
Guderian's designs for the organization and equipage of the
Panzer division took the importance of the combat engineer as an
essential element in the combined-arms concept well into account.
The Panzerpionier battalion was established along the same lines
as the infantry Pionierbatai 1 Ion. However, it was fully
mechanized/motorized to enable its companies to cooperate
effectively with and thus improve the mobility of the maneuver
units they supported. Therefore, certain platoons in the
Panzerpionierbatail Ion were provisioned with several, specially
designed 5-ton Zugkraf twaqen 6, some of which were armor-
protected, and Panzerkampfwagen I, which later were replaced with
the Pzkw II. At the back of these tanks, a special boom was
installed which, when moved into position, extended out over the
front of the vehicle for use in emplacing demolition charges and
removing obstacles while under light weapons fire. 84 Thus, the
Panzerpionier was offered the armor protected cross-country
vehicles to allow them to keep pace and maintain close co-
operation with the maneuver forces they supported, under any type
of condition. The wheeled transport of both the Panzer and
the infantry Pionierbatai 1 Ions facilitated high-speed movement
outside the range of hostile infantry fire and in places where
caterpillar-track vehicles were not necessary. This was
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especially important for the support of combat engineer
operations on the flanks of the Panzer penetrations and for
helping to sustain the tremendous logistical requirements in
engineering materials, ammunitions, and both expendable and non-
expedable stores, such as barbed-wire with pickets, explosives,
bangalore torpedos, landmines, replacement bridging, and
sandbags, not to speak of the normal reprovisioning generated
through offensive actions.
With the added potential of the Panzerpionier
, the German
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combat engineer ability to support mechanized warfare was
complete, and especially prepared for use during an attack. In
mobile operations, divisional engineer reconnaissance elements
were always found with the advanced guard at the head of the
attacking columns. 86 In this way, road blocks and other types of
counter-mobility obstacles could be located early on and combat
engineer forces called forward to clear or breach them before the
main body of the division arrived. In the case where
obstructions or routes of march were covered by enemy defensive
fires, the divisional engineer employed Stosskampfgruppen
(assault combat groups). These company- or battalion-size
formations were constituted when needed through the combination
of engineer, artillery, armor, anti-tank, or infantry elements
and normally placed under the temporary command of the senior
combat engineer. Using the combined-arms techniques, the
Stosskampfgruppe assaulted those strong-points which could not be
by-passed and, using mine detectors, flamethrowers, bangalore
torpedos, and demolition charges, reduced, under the covering
fire of accompanying weapons and/or vehicles, any static
fortified positions or obstacles to allow the advace to
continue. 87 In either situation, the advantage of surprise would
have been lost, if the combat engineers had not been employed
well forward, ready at hand to remove these types of obstacles as
soon as they were met. This was especially important when water
obstacles had to be bridged.
Since rivers presented the most formidable obstacle to
mechanized formations, the planning and execution of operations
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to cross them by assault represented by far the most complex
ones. The efficiency of the German war-machine in negotiating
such barriers illustrates brilliantly the fine co-ordination of
arms, which characterized its tactics, and the part played by
engineers in the combat team. 88 German bridging operations
always proceeded at blitz tempo, starting with the arrival of the
reconnaissance screen. As the advanced guard approached a water
obstacle, crossing sites, affording good access and egress and a
small likelihood for strong enemy resistance, were selected by
the divisional engineer reconnaissance elements. At the same
time, Stosskampfgruppen were constituted and assault water
crossing equipment moved forward, and inconspiciously positioned
close to the crossing site.
With surprise in its favor, the Stosskampfgruppe moved
with Sturmbooten (storm boats) or small pneumatic rubber
assault boats to the river and crossed, under cover fire of
their accompanying support weapons. Once on the far bank, the
resistance of the enemy was broken by the coordinated efforts of
the assaulting infantry and engineer combat teams. After a small
foothold was established, improvised ferries, constructed with
large pneumatic rubber boats and local materials were started.
Light artillery, anti-tank guns, armored cars, and light tanks
were then crossed over to assist in widening the bridgehead and
* * *
The German pneumatic boat was issued in two basic sizes: A
small boat, approximately 3 meters long and 1 meter wide, with a
weight of 53 kilograms and a capacity of 4 men, and a large boat,
6 meters long and 2 meters wide, with a weight of about 160kilograms and a buoyancy of 2 tons. All divisional
Pionierbataillone carried about 30 of the small boats and 20 of
the large boats.
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to repel any determined counter-attack.
Meanwhile, other non-divisional combat engineer units moved
up to augment the crossing operation. A corps engineer battalion
started to assemble float bridging*, if possible at another site
several kilometers upstream, and a corps construction battalion
began to rebuild demolished bridges or to construct a new fixed
bridge in the near vicinity of the crossing site. Initially,
pontoon and trestle rafts
, assembled by the corps engineer
battalion, were moved down the stream to the crossing site to
carry over the medium tanks and other heavy loads of the advanced
party. Then, the division engineer battalion could relinquish
the on-site management of the crossing operation to the corps
engineer battalion and move forward with the main body, together
with its own bridging assets, and continue to support the actions
of the division on the other side of the river. When enough
rafts were moved to the crossing site through use of their
outboard motors, they were positioned and clamped together, by
couplers which engage adjacent gunwales, to form a complete
floating bridge. By this time, the construction battalion had
finished its task so that the main body could cross over both the
floating and fixed bridges, and the division could continue the
advance as a whole. Under good conditions, an entire division
*The German army bridge trains in all divisional and corps
Pionierbatail lonen were the same. This standard bridge company
consisted of enough equipage to construct either 80 meters of a9-ton bridge or 50 meters of an 18-ton. While the 9-ton bridge
could take most loads of the infantry division, the 18-ton could
accomodate the normal loads of the Panzer division. Each bridgetrain also possessed a powerful motor boat and several powerful
(25 hp) outboard motors, and tripods, anchoring devices, and
cables used in constructing a running ferry.
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could be crossed within 24 hours through the use of these
methods.
As the advance continued, the divisional engineers resumed
their positions well forward in the columns they supported. The
objective or Schwerpunkt (point of main effort) of the attack did
not have to be an enemy position, but could be a direction of
advance or a piece of key terrain. Whichever, the ultimate
intent was to envelope the enemy. This made batt ledr i 1 1 s, as
contingencies against enemy counter-attack or attempted break-
through, essential to attacking formations, especially in
armored units which spearheaded the advance. In such a situation
again, the German tactics called for coordination of efforts,
with the combat engineer serving a primary function. When the
tank units, which normally led the formation, encountered enemy
armor, they retired through an extemporaneous anti-tank screen
which was, when time permitted, characteristic of counter-
mobility systems. However, due to the spontaneity of these types
of operations, the combat engineers usually only had time to
emplace minefields or to execute bridge or road crater
demolitions. Once the enemy encountered the blocking formations,
the tank units maneuvered to outflank him. These tactics bear a
distinct likeness to J.F.C. Fuller's idea of the "funnel
formation" used, in this case, as a manifestation of the
Kesselschlacht
.
The operations of the combat engineers clearly illustrate
how effectively the German army had incorporated the innovative
concepts of mechanized warfare to revitalize their traditional
grand strategy. Moreover, the high degree of coordination and
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cooperation, reached between the various arms and within the
Pioniertruppe (corps of engineers) itself, especially in the case
of major assault water crossings, demonstrate how efficiently the
Blitzkrieg formula had reintroduced dynamic mobility to the
modern battefield. The formidableness of the German mechanized
forces was due neither to a greater number of tanks nor to the
invincibility of its armored vehicles, but to the superior
organization and methods of coordinated employment of all arms,
which characterized its Panzer divisions.
An excellent example of the effectiveness of the German
methods can be found in the Meuse River crossing between Dinant
and Sedan, during the Blitzkrieg of France in 1940. Most
military minds of that time were convinced that any armored
forces would be halted for three to four days behind such a
heavily defended major water obstacle, while massed infantry and
artillery forced a crossing. Nevertheless, the Panzer divisions,
adancing 'en masse' through this area, were able to cross at
lightning speed, within 24 hours, due to the efficiency of their
engineer-led combined-arms assault river crossing techniques.
When one considers that the rapid crossing of the Meuse was the
most critical phase of the German campaign plan, the importance
of the combat engineer on the dynamic battlefield can be
understood clearly.
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The Axis Potential for Mechanized Warfare
As the focus of this study moves to the conflict in North
Africa, it has become clear that Germany and, to a lesser degree,
Italy developed their armored forces to effectively wage
mechanized warfare. Their armored divisions were tailored and
indoctrinated for employment as offensive strategic weapons,
based on the cooperation between arms, which allowed them to
conduct independent cross-country operations. To supplement the
mobility of these organizations and to deter that of the enemy,
the combat engineer was doctrinal ly prepared to function in a
direct-support role and, through hasty assistance, to provide
extemporaneously for the needs of all other combat arms. As will
be seen, these capabilities gave the Axis armored forces the
advantage on the mechanized battlefield.
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CHAPTER IV
THE INFLUENCE OF THE DIVISIONAL ENGINEER ON MECHANIZED WARFARE
IN NORTH AFRICA FROM 1940 TO 1942 — TRIAL BY BATTLE
The Dialectics of Armored Warfare on the Desert
The campaigns fought in North Africa were the first
operations in which large-scale mechanized and motorized forces
clashed. The terrific armored battles demonstrated, beyond a
doubt, that well armed, mobile formations were the key to success
in both offensive and defensive actions. In addition, due to the
nature of this area, the characteristic methods and techniques of
mechanized warfare could be employed in their purest form. There
existed almost no natural obstacles to tracked vehicles and,
apart from a few inhabited locations along the coast, there were
neither civilian settlements nor man-made obstructions to
restrict movement or the devastating activities which constituted
modern warfare. As the future commander of the Axis forces in
the desert, General Erwin Rommel himself testified:
North Africa may well have been the theatre in which
the War was waged in its most modern guise ... It was
only in the desert that the principles of armored
warfare as they were taught in theory before the War
could be fully appied and thoroughly developed. It
was only in the desert that real tank battles were
fought by large-scale formations.
-
1-
Accordingly, the conflict, as it rolled back and forth in
the Western Desert, provides the perfect setting for comparing
the Allied concepts of mechanized warfare with those of the Axis.
The superiority of the German methods which achieved such
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decisive results in the Polish and French invasions would slowly
be realized by the Allies who, as a result of the continued
failure of their own procedures in each major action during the
Libyan campaigns, increasingly attempted to adopt those proven by
their opponents. This process of integrating new techniques into
traditional methodology illustrates not only the importance of
the divisional engineer on the modern battlefield but also his
essential function in armored operations. By the time of the
second battle of El Alamein (October-November 1942), the Allied
armies had adopted the major principles of the German concepts of
mechanized warfare and utilized them in their own way, with the
combat engineers forsaking the rear of the battlefield to take an
active and equal position alongside the other combat branches as
a fundamental element in armored warfare.
In their refinement of the principles of mechanized warfare,
the British lagged many years behind their opponents. Due to the
fact that few British tank units participated, the 1940 campaign
in France did little to change the existing perception of the
organization and employment of mechanized/motorized forces. This
defeat only convinced the British military leadership that more
and better tanks, anti-tank guns, and motor transport were
necessary to achieve victory on the battlefield. Consequently,
tank units were still considered mere aids by the infantry-minded
commanders, which allowed them to continue to conduct combat
operations along familiar lines. The heavy infantry tanks still
were to be committed to support deliberate assaults on static
positions and create breaches through which the light and medium
tanks passed to exploit the enemy rear and/or engage his tanks to
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eliminate them. Then, the battle could be pursuied as a contest
between the traditional, non-mechanized formations, with the
infantry as the fundamental constituent.
These subservient and estranged views for the utilization of
mechanized forces fomented a pretentious reaction within the
Royal Tank Corps. Almost as if suffering from a persecution
complex, the armored officer developed an elitist attitude and,
like the knights of old, believed that the tank alone, without
the assistance of any other arm, was the decision-maker on the
modern battlefield. In this way, the armored officer embraced
those tasks which concentrated tanks for battle against the
enemy's armor while, at the same time, disdaining any
responsibility for protecting the vulnerable non-mechanized arms,
as necessitated by the split-up of major formations into combat
teams. This tendency was further encouraged as the Royal Tank
Corps was greatly expanded just before the War through the
redesignation of horse cavalry as mechanized cavalry. Through
this marriage with the cavalry, the armored branch assumed the
characteristics of dash, independence, and the headlong "charge",
as in the old Balaclava tradition.
Thus, the corporate spirit so essential to mechanized
warfare was greatly lacking in the British army of 1940, both
systematically and conceptually. This limited the dynamic
potential of its armored forces, since the cooperation of arms
had not been realized, combined-arms tactical methods had not
been developed, and, in turn, the capabilities of the supportive
combat arms had never been integrated into mechanized operations,
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even though they could significantly have enhanced the overall
potential of the armored formation in both the offensive and
defensive mode. Combined-arms operation constituted the area in
which the British learned most during the campaign of the Western
Desert and, as a result, the role of the divisional engineer
would be altered considerably.
The First Round : The First and Second Libyan Campaigns
In September 1940, General Rodolfo Graziani advanced the
Italian 23rd Corps 60 miles into Egypt and then halted at Sidi
Barrani to consolidate and prepare a final thrust on the Nile.
The Italian forces were sadly short of motorized transport, and
the only tank formations available were those in the infantry
support battalions. Unfortunately, the Italian armored divisions
could not take part in this operation, due to their deployment in
Northern Italy for the invasion of Yugoslavia. In truth, the
invasion of Egypt was very much in the 1918 tradition. Static
positions were established in the vicinity of Sidi Barrani,
consisting of field fortified boxes surrounded by anti-tank
ditches, minefields, and barbed wire. However, these positions
were unsound with each box located out of the supporting distance
of the others. 2 Thus, with the infantry anchored to these
incompatible, static defences, without the capability for rapid
movement needed to counter-attack in strength, and with the only
mechanized formation fragmented in subordination to these
tactics, the Italians invited defeat in detail by a mobile
opponent.
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Figure 4. North-East Africa. 3
Such an adversary existed in the form of the British Western
Desert Force which consisted of the 7th Armored Division, a
virtually all-tank organization trained by General P. Hobart at
the eve of the War, the 7th Royal Tank Regiment, whose powerful
Mark II infantry tanks were sectretly deployed in Egypt, and the
4th Indian Infantry Division, mounted in motor transport. In
December, this corps sized organization counter-attacked to seize
the dispersed Italian positions in an offensive which featured
few of the essential ingredients of mechanized warfare and none
of the strategic paralysis concepts basic to the theories of
Fuller and Liddell Hart. Actually, this succession of limited
assault operations was little more than a modification of World
War I tactics. The mobility of the 7th Armored Division,
equipped predominantly with 1920 vintage Rolls-Royce armored cars
and machine-gun-armed Mark VI vickers light tanks, was utilized
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to isolate the Sidi Barrani dispositions, while the motorized
infantry together with M ar k II (Matilda) infantry tanks
maneuvered, under the cover of heavy artillery bombardement, to
take each box position in succession by dismounted assault. 4
Figure 5. Methods Used at the
battle of Sidi Barrani. 5
Sidi Barrani
The Baltic of Sidi Barrani
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The Italians, poorly led and trained, with no armored
formation capable of decisive action, could offer almost no
resistance to the entrapping actions of the 7th Armored Division
nor to the massive armor of the Matildas which were proof against
Italian anti-tank weapons. As a result, in the words of a
British commander in the Royal Engineers present during the Sidi
Barrani battle:
Here was the decisive element [the M ati l das ] which
made success an absolute certainty; for the Italians
had no guns, except possibly a few heavy anti-
aircraft, able to penetrate such thick armor.
Whenever the M ati l das of the Seventh [Royal Tank
Regiment] rolled into the enemy - that particular
fight was over. 6
If only one Italian armored division had been present in this
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engagement the outcome might have been very different. With the
circumstances as they were, though, the Western Desert Force
could overcome one Italian garrison after another, including the
major fortified points of Bardia and Tobruk, using the same
methods, until Cyrenaica was almost cleared of Italian forces.
Then, by rushing a few medium tanks available across the
desert south of Jebel Akhdar, O'Connor cut off most of the
remains of the Italian 10th Army at Beda Fomm before they could
reach the safety of Tr ipol itania. Here, the first tank versus
tank engagement was fought, when the Italians sent forward some
70 MII/39 medium tanks in an attempt to force a passage.
However, this was no contest as the superior British MK I (A9)
medium tanks easily blasted the Italian armored forces to pieces.
Within two months, O'Connor had advanced 500 miles, captured
130,000 prisoners, 380 tanks, 850 pieces of artillery, and 2,500
motor transport, all with a force never larger than 30,000 men. 7
Jubilantly, the British army wore the victor's laurels and falsly
believed that the successful campaign had been a brilliant
application of the concepts of armored warfare, a misconception
which would soon be realized.
Nevertheless, the first and second Libyan campaigns did have
a significant impact on the function of Commonwealth divisional
engineers, for it was during this period that their role on the
battlefield began to be transformed. During the Italian drive
towards the Nile, the combat engineers were primarily employed in
preparing static type field fortifications in the Mersa Matruh
sector. These defensive positions consisted of concrete pill
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boxes, trenches, anti-tank ditches, and concrete obstacles. In
addition, the divisional engineer workshops produced small
quantities of anti-tank landmines, known as Egyptian Pattern
(E.P.) I, which were fabricated with local materials and
gelignite or TNT and used to make up for the total lack of anti-
tank mines which were needed to supplement the Mersa Matruh
defences and to delay the advance of the Italian divisions
towards Sidi Barrani. 8 This customary utilization of combat
engineer assets could not last, however, once the British
retaliatory forces encountered viable Italian counter-mobility
obstacles.
As the British counter-offensive developed, the divisional
engineers initially followed close behind the assaulting units.
This changed, however, after the attack on Nibeiwa, the first
Sidi Barrani box to be taken, where, when the tanks preceeded the
infantry, five Matildas were put out of commission by landmines.
As an expediant measure during the ensuing assaults, preliminary
attacks by infantry assault forces with accompanying combat
engineer detachments were executed in the early morning darkness
to clear anti-tank mines, to blow gaps in wire entanglements, and
to fill in or bridge anti-tank ditches to enable the safe passage
of infantry tanks through this breach just before dawn. 9 The
mine-clearing function gained even more importance when Italian
tripmines (anti-personnel) were encountered during the breaching
of the Tobruk defences. Thus, the combat engineer began to be
losely associated with assaults on fortified positions covered by
anti-tank obstacles, since this was more or less a precautionary
measure to negate the immobilization rather than the total
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destruction of tanks. Although the importance of locating the
combat engineers at the head of the advancing columns was further
emphasized as they encountered the maze of Italian counter-
mobility obstacles which blocked the routes of march through the
heights of Jebel Akdhar, 10 such procedures remained far from
being considered a standard course of action.
The extensive use of counter-mobility obstacles during the
Italian defensive and rear-guard actions prompted the British to
seek methods to improve their own such capabilities. This was
particularly so for anti-tank mines, which the Italians employed
extensively during their retreat, especially after skirmishes
between the British and German/ Italian forces around El Agleila
on Febuary 26, in which the Axis forces had laid considerable
minefields in front of various defensive positions, utilizing "S"
anti-personnel and Tel ler anti-tank mines. As part of the
British effort to consolidate on their recent gains, the
divisional engineers relayed extensively on these experiences in
preparing hasty defensive systems, the most elaborate positions
being constructed along the escarpments five miles east of
Barce 11 and several miles west of Marsa Brega. Hasty obstacles
were incorporated to supplement both the possibility of
withdrawal and defensive actions, including the rigging of road
craters and bridges for demolition, and the emplacement of
minefields. In addition, a scheme of obstacle installation was
planned in the forward areas to delay the enemy.
Similarly to the new found mobility tasks of the combat
engineer, these counter-mobility functions were still only
137
arbitrary courses of action. The most significant ramifications
of this weakness would soon be felt, especially those pertaining
to minefields, since no standardized system of marking,
emplacing, or clearing of landmines had been developed or
doctrinized yet. These engineer activities must have appeared to
be more effective than they really were, however, because Rommel
decided to prematurely launch his planned counter-offensive in
March rather than in May to prevent the British from turning
these defensive systems into a formidable offensive deterrent. 12
The Second Round : The Third and Fourth Libyan Campaigns
Resting on its laurels, the British Western Desert Force was
far less prepared to wage mechanized warfare than most believed
at the time. Its most obvious debilities were recovery, repair,
and maintenance, the major problem being the non-standardization
of parts and fittings for the various fleets of armored
vehicles, whose production was unsystematica 1 ly spread over a
large number of firms. During the British counter-offensive, in
which only a handful of tanks were lost to enemy fire, almost
the entire armored force was put out of action due to break-down,
since the recovery and repair of such vehicles took weeks or even
months. When Rommel struck in late March 1941, the Force was
still suffering for want of vehicles. The British Force was
really handicapped, however, by a much less perceptible weakness,
the inability to maintain a coordinated effort between widely
dispersed units on a rapidly changing battlefield. The lack of
an adequate wireless communication network greatly compounded
this deficiency. Against an audaciously led enemy force, equally
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or better equipped with armored vehicles and weapons, and with
surprise on its side, the Western Desert Force was no match, even
in withdrawal operations.
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Figure 6. Rommel's First Offensive — March 1941. 13
Initially, Rommel intended to attack only to improve his own
position and to prevent the British from establishing formidable
minefields and defences, which would have inhibited his planned
Mayoffensive. With the hasty and disorganized retreat of the
British forces from the Marsa Brega position, however, the Axis
commander sensed the unsound condition of the Western Desert
Force and decided to exploit his success with only the 5th Light
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[Panzer], the Ariete Armored,* and the Bresica Infantry
Divisions. 15 within 15 days, this Italo-German formation rolled
rolled the Commonwealth forces all the way back to the Egyptian
frontier and seized the Halfaya Pass; only Tobruk was left in
Allied hands. Through a strategy of rapidly thrusting in several
widely dispersed directions at the same time, Rommel gained the
upper hand by throwing the British centralized command and
central structure into confusion and turning their withdrawal
into a rout by maintaining both an operational and a logistical
intimidation over their retreat. Possessing unsuitable
communications ability for fragmented operations, the Western
Desert Force could at no time effect a coordinated delaying
action (it tried in vain to fall back on the Barce defensive line
when the Marsa Brega position had been lost) so that, due to
breakdown or being outmaneuvered, its armored forces ceased to
exist.
The lack of organization decisively influenced to outcome of
this engagement. Since the divisional engineer organization had
possessed no wireless communications of its own, it had to be
split up into small units, assigned to each of the major
divisional combat formations in order to provide counter-mobility
support. 16 This caused two difficulties. First, it scattered
The Ariete Division had been reequipped with the new M13/40
medium tank (with a turret mounted 47mm cannon) before being
shipped to Libya in late January 1941. Designed to be the mainbattle tank of the Italian armored division, this armored vehicle
was equipped with an effective high velocity anti-tank gun andprovided with thicker armor making it superior to the Mll/39
which it replaced. Thus, the Italian armored units faced by the
British army in 1941 were far better equipped and organized for
mechanized warfare than those which fought at Beda Fomm a few
months earlier. q
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the combat engineer assets and placed them under the control of
headquarters who, due to the lack of standard operating
procedures, had little understanding of how to incorporate
counter-mobility effectively into overall operations. Second,
without the means of wireless communications, the divisional
engineer headquarters could neither assist in improving the
situation nor act as the focal point for coordination of the
counter-mobility effort across the entire divisional front and
thus exert the control necessary for an orderly withdrawal.
Consequently, the status of the CRE was amended from that of
"Commander" of Engineers to "Engineer Advisor" or staff officer,
a situation which was also extended to the engineer headquarters
associated with commands above division level. In the words of
one corps CRE:
All these engineer units were under Divisional Control
for employment, and while I could issue technical
instructions direct, any personal contact had to
tactfully arranged through their real masters. 1 '
Such conditions also greatly undermined the potential of the
combat engineer in the area of logistics and technical expertise.
The absence of efficient and prioritized coordinating methods to
provide for the prompt supply and transport of engineer materials
and stores to meet the demands of mobile operations left the
divisional engineers without the resources to emplace obstacle
systems rapidly and viably. In addition, without the advantage
of centralized control and standardized methods, the competency
of lower eschalons in the divisional engineer formations
suffered. During the blocking actions in both the Jebel Akhdar
heights and along the avenues of approach across the desert to
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its south, some obstacles were ineffective due to improper
emplacement or insufficient charges, others were by-passed by the
Italo-German formations because they had not been tied in with
the surrounding natural or man-made obstructions. 18
Without the propensity for a concerted and correlated
effort, counter-mobility operations were ineffective. Only the
strongly fortified Port of Tobruk, sitting on the Italo-German
lines of communication with a garrison of 36,000 troops, stopped
Rommel from sweeping into Egypt. Regardless of the arrival of
the 15th Panzer Division on 10 April, Rommel failed in his
attempt to take Tobruk by assault, primarily due to the fact that
he did not possess sufficient forces to guard the Egyptian
frontier and to invest Tobruk's formidable defences
simultaneously (before the War, the Italians had incorporated
thousands of tons of concrete and steel into these, so that they
now consisted of a double row of strong points and trenches
forming a 50km long semicircle around the harbor; this line was
further strengthened with barbed wire, tank ditches, and
minefields). In light of this situation, Rommel decided to
consolidate his position and wait for further reinforcements
before making another attempt to capture Tobruk. The 15th Panzer
Division's Pionierbatai 1 Ion was immediately given tha task of
constructing a defensive line along the Solium- Halfaya axis. On
the high ground around Halfaya, several deadly dual-purpose 88mm
guns (Panzer/Fliegerabwehrkanonen ) and a substantial number of
Italian guns were dug in and camouflaged, with the anti-tank
artillery being emplaced in pits so that when the barrels were
elevated horizontally, they could practically not be seen. In
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addition, all-round defensive positions and protective minefields
were provided. 19 Infantry heavy battle groups were employed in
this defensive line, while the rest of the 15th Panzer Division
was stationed near Bardia as a mobile reserve counter-attack
force.
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Figure 7. Operation Battleaxe — June 1941. 20
In June, the British, recently reinforced with medium and
heavy tanks, decided to test these defences in an effort to
regain the initiative and to relieve the beleagured garrison in
Tobruk. Through "Operation Battleaxe" the Western Desert Force
employed the same tactics as against the Italians less than a
This is a clear example of Fuller's tank/anti-tank wing concept.
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year before. The infantry, supported by heavy tanks, conducted a
frontal assault from both the east and the west side of the
German fixed defences at So 1 lum-Hal f aya, while the 7th Armored
Division and 7th Armored Brigade maneuverd around behind,
engaged to destroy the enemy's armed forces, and thus isolated
the positions at So 1 lum-Ha 1 f aya. Here for the first time, the
British witnessed the offensive and defensive potential of the
combined-arms team. It was also the first mechanized battle in
which, at least equipment-wise, equitable armored forces clashed.
Superior tactical skills on the part of the Germans caused the
offensive to fall apart quickly and with heavy losses. 21
As the 7th Armored Brigade and 7th Armored Division advanced
looking for a tank versus tank encounter, the 15th Panzer and 5th
Light Panzer divisions moved their mobile anti-tank elements
forward to fight defensively from key terrain. These dug-in
positions were spontaneously established and protected with hasty
minefields. The British tank formations,* racing ahead of their
supporting combat arms and attacking in true Balaclava tradition,
were first mauled by the anti-tank fire of the hastily prepared
positions and then smashed by the ensuing flanking counter-
attacks of the German tank formations. With the British armor
routed, the Panzer units proceeded to overrun the unarmored
The British Armored Division at this time consisted of a light
armored Brigade (three battalions of light and medium tanks), aheavy armored brigade (three battalions of medium tanks), and a
supporting arms group (a motorized infantry battalion, a
motorized artillery battalion, and an engineer squadron
[company]). The Armored Brigade was organized almost exclusively
on medium tank battalions. They were basically all-tank
formations and incapable of combined-arms operations by
themselves.
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combat support and service support elements which followed up on
the advance of the British tanks. This German combat drill of
employing anti-tank guns to destroy the enemy's armor and then
unleashing their panzers to deal with the troops and thin-skinned
vehicles was used in sequence until the British armored
formations were forced to retreat from exhaustion.
The infantry-based attacks on the Sol 1 urn-Hal faya defensive
positions fared even worse. The prevalent 1918 idea that the
tactical role of the tank was to preceed the infantry in the
attack held true here also. Before the heavily armored, slow
moving infantry tanks could move close enough to fire effectively
with their own guns, they were engaged by the armor-piercing
shells of the dug-in 88mm anti-tank guns. As they moved closer,
they became immobilized in the German protective minefields
within point-blank range of these deadly weapons. It was here
that the assault dissipated as the Matildas were destroyed, some
with their turrets completely blown off. Meanwhile, the infantry
assault forces, left unprotected and without heavy support fire,
were cut down and halted by the German machinegun fire. Although
the combat engineers were called forward to clear withdrawal
passages for the remaining tanks, few escaped destruction. 22
The losses in Battleaxe were devastating for the British.
Of the 90 medium and the 100 heavy tanks, which began the battle,
29 medium and 58 heavy were lost. The Germans, practically
unscathed, had only 25 tanks disabled. The necessity for more
tactical cooperation between arms was sensed by the British for
the first time, and, in the next six months, efforts were made
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within the various formations of the Western Desert Force, to
eliminate this deficiency. This was especially so in the
engineer units. Besides continuing the defensive works at Marsa
Matruh and initiating a new line at El Alamein, the divisional
engineers developed methods which allowed them to work more
closely with the attacking formations. Realizing the need for
spontaneous assistance at the very head of advancing columns,
they devised standard battle drills for the assault clearing of
lanes through enemy protective minefields, and for laying hasty
minefields of their own against enemy armor attack. 23
For clearing passages, the procedures required that the
combat engineers, under covering fire, move ahead of the assault
forces, blow gaps in the barbed-wire with Bang lore torpedos, and
locate the mines by prodding with bayonets. Then a piece of
gelignite, gripped around lines of cortex detonating fuse, was
placed on top of each mine so that, once the opposite side of the
mined area was reached, the clearing party could blast a lane,
wide enough for the tanks to pass through. The speed of this
process was enhanced for at least a few clearing parties with the
intoduction of field-expedient mine detectors, which were
developed 24 and issued in limited numbers. By the end of 1941
only 13 of these very crude mine detectors were available to the
entire Western Desert Force. The laying of hasty protective
mines was somewhat standardized through use of a mine measuring
line, which was similar in design and use to the German
M inenmessdraht
.
This method for emplacing minefields became
known as the Indian Rope Trick. To allow for its timely
application in support of offensive operations, the divisional
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engineer sections/troops (platoons) were issued anti-tank mines
to carry with them into battle.
Once they had been propagated throughout the combat engineer
organization, these measures served to place the Commonwealth
divisional engineers on the front lines, where they belonged.
Unfortunately, they were still handicapped by the continued use
of an ineffective command and control structure, caused primarily
by the lack of wireless communication, a problem further
compounded, especially during offensive operations, by the lack
of adequate combat transport. The field engineer
companies/squadrons were basically equipped with 36 unarmored
trucks, varying from 8cwt runabouts to 2-ton six-wheelers, most
of which belonged to the two-wheel drive 1928 vintage (Morris-
commercial D-type) or 1935 vintage (Morris 8cwt and 15cwt) fleets
of vehicles, and were not very effective as cross-country
transport. 25 In all, some 13 different tpyes of transport
existed within the typical combat engineer field unit, 26 causing
vehicle servicing systems to be overly complex. This, together
with the wear-and-tear of desert conditions, placed demands on
the repair and maintenance capabilities which could hardly be
met. Nevertheless, the spirit of close cooperation with the
supported combat arms had finally taken hold and now only needed
to be practically implemented.
While the British endeavored to ameliorate their combat
readiness, the Italo-German forces made efforts to enhance their
position. In order to continue his siege of Tobruk, Rommel
decided to employ an improved reiteration of the methods used
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against Battleaxe. The task of elaborating the Sol lum-Halfaya
line was assigned to the Panzergruppe Pionierkommando (engineer
headquarters), by placing these positions, which were garrisoned
by four battalion size combat groups, under the direct control of
the Pionierkommando Chief, Colonel Hecker. 27 The line also was
extended from the Halfaya Pass to Sidi Omar, and garrisoned by
the Italian Savona Infantry Division (reinforced by German
detachments with 88mm guns).
This defensive line is a perfect example of the cooperation
of arms which characterized German counter-mobility methods. 28
Consisting of a system of independently fortified strong points,
which supported each other with overlapping fires, this anti-tank
shield was methodically developed. The procedures initially
involved the employment of anti-tank weapons throughout the line,
sited and dug in on rising ground, and infantry formations around
these anti-tank defensive cores, which were situated in stone
lined trenches and gun pits to provide protection against
dismounted assault (in some places, captured British heavy
infantry tanks were sunk in the ground with only their turrets
exposed). Finally, these self-contained positions were
surrounded with formidable, well-disguised minefields, which were
emplaced so that they could be covered effectively by both anti-
tank and anti-personnel fires. Furthermore, these mined areas
were distanced far enough out to prevent enemy tank and infantry
formations from moving close enough to engage the protected anti-
tank gun positions effectively, and were arranged to channel
enemy units trying to detour the mined areas into kill zones. In
this way, the attacking formations were disrupted, slowed down,
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and then blunted, and thus placed in a weakened state, giving the
counter-attacking maneuver forces the advantage.
This mobile reserve for the Sol lum-Ha 1 faya-Sidi Omar
positions was constituted by dispersing two armored reconaissance
battalions between Fort Capuzzo and Sidi Omar. 29 To prevent a
British end-sweep of the defensive line, Rommel deployed the
Ariete Armored Division at Bir Gubi and the 21st Panzer Division
(the 5th Light Division had been redesignated) between this
position and Bardia. The rest of the Axis forces were involved
in the siege of Tobruk. Although Rommel possessed the equivalent
of only three armored brigades, the application this Fullerite
type defence prepared him to take on effectively the five
brigades of armor, assembled by the British for their next
offensive.
As compared to Battleaxe, operation "Crusader" was only
grander in scale and complexity. Throughout the summer and fall,
new tanks, trucks, and weapons flowed into Egypt and, by November
1941, the British armored brigades had been completely refitted
with the latest eqipment, including 336 medium tanks (mostly the
new Crusader), 195 America-made M3 Stuart tanks, and 225 heavy
infantry tanks. Against this formidable array, Rommel could
muster 414 light and medium tanks. With its superior force, the
newly constituted 8th Army intended to attack by sending its 13th
Corps (4th Indian and the New Zealand infanty divisions supported
by the 1st Tank Brigade) to pin down the Sol lum-Ha Ifaya-Sidi Omar
line, and the 30th Corps (4th, 7th, and 22nd armored brigades
supported by the 1st South African Infantry Division) to sweep
around the desert flank to destroy the Axis armored forces in a
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Figure 8. Operation Crusader — Nov. -Dec. 1941. 30
decisive tank versus tank battle and then to move on towards
Tobruk and link up with the 70th Division, which simultaneously
attempted to break-out of the besieged city. The cooperation of
arms was highly recommended throughout these operations.
Unfortunately, Commonwealth formations had not been reorganized
to function readily as a combined-arms team, and even worse, a
coherent system of methods and training had been neither
completely standardized nor sufficiently practiced before-hand. 31
Thus, even though the British army now possessed better equipment
its techniques had not really improved.
As a consequence, once the decisive tank battle did not
materialize, which caused the defensive to degenerate into a
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series of uncoordintaed actions, the blunders of Battleaxe were
repeated. In the heat of battle, the major combat arms
completely disregarded the principles of combined-arms
operations, which they had been haphazardly trained in, and
reverted back to their old way of fighting alone. As the British
phalanxes of tanks charged forward in true cavalry style and
attempted to engage the German armor, they were shot to a stand-
still by the German tank screens (anti-tank artillery, infantry,
and combat engineers) and subsequently scattered by the counter-
attacking German tank units. Since the headquarters' and
supporting arms' positions had not expended the effort to dig in
sufficiently, they were overrun by the exploiting Panzer
formations. As one German officer relates:
A good number of anti-tank guns still seemed to be
unready for action. They were not dug in, but were,
some of them, still on their portees [transport
vehicle for anti-tank weapons] . 2
The divisional engineer formations accompanying the combat
support arms and headquarters, if used, could have blocked these
enemy armored deluges. Unfortunately, the advantages of tactical
minefields were not appreciated, in fact, they were disliked,
especially by the armored officers who considered them nothing
more than deadly and menacing devices which tended to clutter up
the battlefield. Thus, even though the divisional engineers
carried sufficient quantities of anti-tank mines to prevent the
overrunning of the more static and less protected units, few
combat engineer elements actually were allowed to emplace
protective minefields. 33
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Regardless of the fact that the combat engineers were not
employed as they should have been, they provided as much as any
of the other major combat arms for the destruction of enemy
armored vehicles through innovation. The Crusader battles lasted
for weeks and though the British could not readily recover
knocked out tanks, the Axis forces were doing so and recommitted
their repaired tanks at a remarkable rate. Accordingly, the
Commonwealth divisional engineers were given, the task of
demolishing disabled tanks before the enemy could recover them. 34
To do this, tank destroyer parties were sent out, often in the
midst of battle and, by the end of the Crusader operation, 212
Axis armored vehicles had been eliminated in this manner. In the
subsequent campaigns, this became a primary function of the
divisional engineer and, interestingly enough, was an important
factor in the decision to equip them with armored vehicles.
The setbacks experienced in the attack of the 30th Corps
were paralleled in the infantry assault on the Sol lum-Halfaya-
Sidi Omar line. Due to the deceptiveness of the German minefield
arrangement, they could not be located most of the time until the
heavy infantry tanks had already ventured onto them. By then,
the combination of the Axis anti-personne 1 /anti-tank fires
precluded the extraction of those tanks which were immobilized or
the creation of gaps for following tanks to pass through. The
primary problem lay in the fact that the engineers alone could
not clear lanes through minefields that were covered by enemy
fire and that the infantry rarely came forward to lend
assistance, since they had not been indoctrinated with the
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techniques to do so. Consequently, the Axis combined-arms
defence remained impregnable to a succession of British assaults.
As the commander of the attacking forces so aptly accounts of the
attack on Sidi Omar:
Derek Gayland led the attack force [dismounted
infantry and heavy tanks] at top speed to where the
night's daring reconnaissance had revealed the gap but
mines had been laid by the German-Italian parties
working desperately through the predawn hours. In a
matter of moments three carriers and four tanks [had
their] tracks blown off within point blank range of
hidden 88's. Now the second echelon of tanks ran into
the mines ... Again [another attack] an apparent gap
in the minefields was a trap, being covered by a dug-
in battery of 88's. At 800 yards range they could not
miss and the leading tanks erupted into horrible,
flaming wrecks ... [As other tanks tried to avoid
minefields] the combination of these two enemy guns to
their right, and minefields to their left acted like a
funnel, down which the squadrons passed on an ever
decreasing front, until, when eventually a few tanks
succeeded in reaching the forward enemy posts, they
were almost in line ahead and broadside to the 88's.
The Germans knocked out tank after tank.
The defences in fact, with the exception of those around southern
Sidi Omar, overrun when an improperly mined passage was
discovered 36
, held out well past the duration of Crusader and
were eliminated weeks later, when the surrounding garrison
surrendered due to lack of water and ammunition.
For three weeks, the Crusader offensive flowed back and
forth over the battlefield, until the 8th Army literally won
through attrition, forcing Rommel's worn out, but not defeated,
forces back on their defensive line at El Aghleila. During this
operation the British had failed again to effectuate the
principles of armored warfare and therfore were unable to destroy
the Axis forces, even though the 8th Army possessed far superior
153
combat strength. In fact, the Army's forces were so mishandled
that, by .OP the time they reached the western end of Cyrenaica,
its resources were almost completely consumed. Rommel's counter-
offensive in January 19 42 initiated the next and final round to
be fought on the Western Desert, during which the British finally
developed the so-desperately-needed methods for the cooperation
between arms.
The Third Round : The Fifth and Sixth Libyan Campaigns
After receiving new tanks, armored cars, and supplies, the
Axis forces launched a counter-strike in late January 1942,
giving the fatigued 8th Army almost no respite since the
termination of its pursuit in late December. As the Italo-German
forces advanced using the expanded torrent, Rommel decided to
divert his main effort north-westward, towards Benghasi, rather
than across the desert, towards Tobruk, as he had done in his
March-1941 offensive. By thrusting through the Commonwealth
weaker right flank, he caused the British to be thrown off
balance turning their retreat into a repeat performance of their
withdrawal in March/April 1941. With the exception of improved
techniques in the employment of delaying obstacles, especially in
the Jebel Akhdar heights, Rommel moved rather rapidly until, in
February, his forces were halted before the defensive line which
the British had hastily prepared at Gazala. Here, both armies
rested for three months, the Axis forces for further
reinforcements and the 8th Army to strengthen its defences and to
reequip and reorganize its formations.
The defensive line, which developed between Gazala on the
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coast and Bir Hacheim, some 40 miles inland, is yet another
example of the 1918 mentality, which inhibited the Allied
leadership. 38 with the Gazala line, the British attempted to
duplicate the effective defensive system developed by the Axis
forces in the Sol lum-Halfaya-Sidi Omar line. With their limited
comprehension of combined-arms operations, however, they created
little more than a minature Maginot line, which lacked inter-
cooperabi 1 ity and depth. In design, this line consisted of
brigade-size boxes situated out of supporting distance of each
other, which were surrounded by wire marked, mined belts. The
spaces between these positions were filled in with "mine
marshes". The employment of the mined areas as deterrents rather
than, as with the Axis forces, as a channelizing weapon,
constituted the primary deficiency of this arrangement. 39 Even
worse, these mine marshes were not covered by fire. Thus,
British mine warfare did not fulfil its essential function of
halting tanks where they presented the best target for the anti-
tank defence, since mines were not sited and concealed for this
purpose. With the exception of two brigade boxes, 25 and 30
miles to the east near El Adem, the Gazala line possessed
virtually no strong points to the rear and/or to the open flank,
making the British still susceptible to destruction in detail.
This, together with the vast uncovered distances between the
self-contained, defended boxes, which could be by-passed or
attacked individually, made the Gazala line vulnerable to both
penetration and envelopment by a dynamically employed combined-
arms mechanized opponent.
155
XIJm
2b HAY
x corps h.'r-T-\- 3i-s-I/ESa \
**'""•
\sM-',- y
LEGEND
'-
-.- j ~ Alt -!Af m
Bniita Pajiiutaa C
Figure 9. The Battle of Gazala, Phase 1 — May 1942. 40
The formations which manned these defences (boxes)
represented the first attempt by the British to organize
combined-arms combat teams. 4, They were organized into infantry
brigade groups consisting of three battalions of infantry, one
field artillery regiment, one anti-tank and one anti-aircraft
battalion, one combat engineer and one machine-gun company, and
other supporting arms. Unfortunately, these units were not
tactically mobile and could only be moved in relays rather than
simultaneously. To defend the areas between the box positions
armored brigade and motor brigade groups were intended to be
formed, with the former to contain three tank regiments, one
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motorized infantry battalion, and one regiment of field and anti-
tank guns, and the latter of motorized infantry with a similar
accompaniment of artillery. Although some progress had been made
in the formation of these units, neither the armored nor the
motorized infantry brigade groups were established when Rommel
continued his offensive in March 1942.
Rommel's plan was based on Liddell Hart's "indirect
approach". ^j The Axis infantry was deployed to pin down the
Gazala line, while the Axis armor made an end sweep aroung Bir
Hacheim to paralyze the British command and control and service
support systems, and ultimately cut off and destroy the British
divisions in the Gazala positions, including the armored units
behind them. As this armored battle progressed, "Battle Group
Hecker" under the command of the Pionierkommando and consisting
of one battalion of Italian marines with heavy support weapons,
German combat engineers, and tanks, would conduct an amphibious
assault between Gazala and Tobruk to help isolate the defensive
line.
On 26 March, 1942, the Axis forces struck in this manner and
threw their opponent, who had considered an attack on the left
flank impossible, into complete confusion. 43 As the armored
spearheads thrust forward, two infantry brigades were overwhelmed
and the 7th Armored Division Headquarters captured before it
could evacuate the area, making that division no longer a
coherent fighting force. At this point, a major tank battle
ensued and, as one German officer testifies, the tactics of the
British armored formations showed little change from those used
in Battleaxe and Crusader:
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The Grants [M3 medium tank] and Matildas charged home
recklessly — our tanks took a severe hammering ... It
is true that our anti-tank gunners exacted a heavy
toll, but in some cases the British tanks forced their
way up the very muzzles of guns and wiped out the
crews. 44
By the 27th of May, the sheer numbers of the Commonwealth forces
in guns, tanks, and men, without any definate plan or guidance,
through nothing but instinctive courage, had fought the Axis
columns to a standstill. If the command and contol of the 8th
Army had not been disrupted so much, and had been able to
concentrate its armored forces, the Axis offensive could have
been crushed at this point. Now, Rommel switched over to the
defensive before the British could get their house in order.
The Axis armored forces moved and lodged themselves firmly
within the nest of mine marsches in the center of the Gazala
line. Here, Rommel prepared to fight a Kesselschlacht
,]^, whose
execution very much resembled Fuller's "funnel formation".
Meanwhile, assault teams, led by the combat engineers of the
Italian Trieste and Pavia infantry divisions, barely restored
communications with the isolated Axis armor by cutting a series
of small gaps through enemy mine marches, while under fire of the
150th Infantry Brigade Group box. Even though the British
believed the breaching of the massive mine belts to be nearly
impossible, especially when covered by fire, the Italians
accomplished this feat within one night. This was possible only
through cooperation of arms; under the covering fire of attached
heavy weapons, the combat engineers had moved forward and blown
gaps in the wire for the infantry element who passed through and
established a bridgehead on the other side of the mine march
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(there were no anti-personnel mines). Through this combination
of the infantry cover fire in front and the heavy weapons behind,
the Italian engineers were able to clear lanes fairly rapidly. 47
The vital supplies moving through these passages allowed Rommel
to employ an anti-tank screen against the British armored
formations and to concentrate his own armored divisions for the
investment of the 150th Brigade box, which was accomplished by 5
June. Afterwards, while the British planned their next move in
true 1918 tempo, Rommel was given four days of deparately needed
respite. During this time, the Axis forces consolidated their
new position by forming a bridgehead in the Gazala line, which
soon came to be known as the Cauldron.
In their subsequent attack on this position, the British
attempted combined-arms tactics on a large scale for the first
time in the desert war. However, the operation became far too
complex for forces without any experience in such methods when
under fire. According to this plan, the infantry was used to
drive a wedge through the enemy's anti-tank screen during the
night before the armor passed through this corridor the next
morning to destroy the enemy's tanks positioned in the rear. 47
In actuality, the attack turned into a disaster. In the center,
the infantry could not locate the enemy anti-tank positions and,
when the armor advanced to perform the planned exploitation, it
ran head on into the deadly enemy 88mm screen. The armored
exploitation from the north ran into the 21st Panzer Division dug
in on the Sidra ridge and was cut to ribbons and forced into a
minefield as it tried to retreat. As the armored formation
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Figure 10. Battle of Gazala, Phase 2 (the Cauldron)
— June 5-6. 48
evaporated from the battlefield, the infantry was left behind to
be overrun. Then, in a giant double envelopment, Rommel counter-
attacked and smashed the majority of the British armored units,
which were moving up to support the attack.
By a brilliant application of the funnel formation, Rommel
had not only regained the initiative but had crippled the 8th
Army in the process. This was followed up by another, limited
victory when, between 8 and 10 June, the engineer-heavy Battle
Group Hecker (Rommel had cancelled the planned amphibious
assault), assisted by the 15th Panzer Division and the 90th Light
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Division, succeeded in capturing Bir Hecheim through the
employment of battle drills similar to those used in the Italian
breaching of the minefields west of the Cauldron. 49 With the
exception of the remaining British armored formations assembled
in the eastern vicinity of Knightsbridge, the road to Tobruk was
open. On 12 and 13 June, during a meeting-engagement, this final
balance of British armored potential was defeated in detail, when
the Axis mechanized forces broke up its combined-arms forces.
With the 8th Army in complete retreat towards Marsa Matruh,
Rommel deployed his full combat power against Tobruk, which fell
on 21 June .
As the victorious Axis army raced forward in headlong
pursuit of the beaten, but still considerably larger, 8th Army,
it tried desparately to overtake the Commonwealth forces before
they had the opportunity to create another new front with fresh
formations from the Egyptian hinterlands.^ within one week, a
battle originated at Marsa Matruh, where the retreating British
army despondently tried to regroup and hastily strengthen the
existing defensive line in the hope of halting Rommel's
lightning exploitation. The Matruh defensive line,
unfortunately, suffered from the same deficiencies, which had
weakened the Gazala position. Conseguently, on the night of the
26th of June, instead of enveloping the line as at Gazala, the
Axis forces cleared a passage through the nine-mile long mine
marsh covering the gap between the two major boxes and sent all
its armored formations through making the entire line untenable.
Again, the remnants of the 8th Army were in full retreat
161
streaming back to the final defensive position in Egypt, El
Alamein.
At Marsa Matruh, the speed of movement, together with
surprise (the ability to penetrate the British line where least
expected with massed combat power) enabled the Axis army to
create disorder by paralyzing command and control, and morale of
the 8th Army. In spite of Rommel's success at Marsa Matruh, the
realities of geography, logistics, and relative combat strengths
prohibited a repeat performance at El Alamein. Since there were
only a few avenues of approach through the British line, which
supported mechanized movement, the restraints of terrain forced
the Axis armored thrust, for the first time, to advance along the
lines of natural expectation, thus allowing the Commonwealth
forces to consolidate on these points and regain their
equilibrium. In such a situation, the attacker's success
depended on his ability to employ an immense margin of superior
combat strength, a resource which was never, throughout the
conflict on the Western Desert, at Rommel's disposal.
Accordingly, throughout the month of July 1942, mobile warfare
gave way gradually to static operations and the initiative of the
Western Desert conflict passed to the British who were now firmly
based on the El Alamein line. During the next four weeks, as
both armies frantically elaborated their defences and replenished
their weary formations with new men, material, and equipment, the
8th Army put forth another effort to improve its tactical skills.
The methods of the German armored forces were finally
realized and, to improve their battlefield performance, the
British now tried in their own way to emulate them. This was
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first done defensively^^ when they gave depth to the El Alamein
line by establishing anti-tank defensive screens along the
expected routes of enemy attack and to the rear of the main
defences. These strong points consisted of dug-in artillery,
anti-tank guns, and pre-excavated defilade fire points for tanks.
To the front of these positions, entrenched infanry formations
were located for defence against dismounted attack, and
protective anti-tank minefields emplaced to deter enemy armored
vehicles. In the near vicinity of these anti-tank defences,
armored brigades and divisions provided mechanized counter-
attacking capability. This cooperation-of-arms defence, however,
unlike the German divisional system, was coordinated at the corps
or army level. 52 The conservative instincts, together with the
regimental and sevice separatism, which had caused the brigade
and divisional size combined-arms operations to break down during
the fighting on the Gazala and El Alamein lines, ultimately
caused the 8th Army leadership to avoid employing such principles
below the corps level of command and control. In truth, the
British military establishment needed many years of training and
indoctrination before the existing traditional attitudes could
have been moderated in favor of a combined-arms mentality at the
divisional or brigade level of coordination. Nevertheless, a
conversion of tactical concepts had been reached at El Alamein
and improved the combat effectiveness of the British forces.
When Rommel launched one last attempt to crack the El
Alamein line, August 30 - September 2, 1942, the improved methods
in the employment of 8th Army forces was dearly felt by the Axis
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spearheads. 53 As the Italo-German armored formations worked
their way through the mine marshes south of Qaret el Abd during
the night, they suffered heavy casualties from indirect artillery
fire. The next morning, after a passage had been cleared, the
armored spearheads turned north-east to move in behind the El
Alamein line and, here, faced another unexpected difficulty, as
Colonel Beyerlein noted: "The strength of the defences of the
Alam el Haifa ridge came as a complete surprise to me. I was
sure I could take it and went on attacking it much too long.
"54
At the end of the first day, the Axis forces lay stalled on
positions just south of the critical heights, where they
regrouped to continue the attack in the early hours of 1
September. During the next day, just as the Italo-German
formations moved within striking distance of the ridge, the 7th
Armored Division caught the assaulting forces in the flank and
pinned down the attack. The Axis armored formations had been
Figure 11. Battle
of the Alam el
Haifa Ridge. 55
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beaten by their own tactics. From this point until the end of
the War, the Germans and, to a lesser degree, the more static
Italians steadily lost their mobility as their enemies, through
emulation, increased their own.
One of the best examples of this trend was the British
plan of the counter-offensive (Operation Lightfoot) , to be
launched two months later, with the expressed purpose of
Figure 12.
Operation
Lightfoot
Oct. 1942. 56
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enveloping, rather than destroying through combat, the remaining
forces in Egypt. According to it, cooperation between arms again
was to be executed on grand scale. 57 Divisions of infantry,
supported by heavy infantry tanks and working in conjunction with
their divisional engineers, first assaulted to breach the Axis
minefields and defences. Then armored formations poured through
this bridgehead and occupied positions deep in the left rear of
the Italo-German line to dominate its supply and communication.
Then, the British armor met the Axis tanks and destroyed them as
they tried to brake through the encirclement. Once the Axis
defences had crumbled and their armor defeated, the British
mechanized forces pursued to overtake and capture the remnants of
the retreating Italo-German army. In an operation which very
much resembled the German Kesselschlacht , the British infantry
formations were employed to assist the armored spearheads through
enemy defences, whose tanks, in turn, provided an iron shield to
protect the infantry. Both were working in conjunction with the
aim of bringing the enemy to battle on defensible ground of their
own choice, with the purpose of enveloping to annihilate. As
part of this formula, the divisional engineers played an
essential part.
The German obstacle system and combined-arms defence methods
made mobility operations almost impossible. However, for British
maneuver forces to succeed offensively, this problem had to be
resolved. During the Cauldron, Marsa Matruh, and El Alamein
battles, the Axis assault groups proved, to the amazement of the
British, that it was feasible to make gaps through mined areas
rapidly, at night and under fire. Consequently, during the
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occupation of the El Alamein line, a Schoo l of M ines was
established by the Royal Engineers with the purpose of
determining how to breach mined areas most adventageous ly, of
trying out new mine clearing ideas and devices, and of teaching
and evolving standard drills. 53 The methods realized through the
ef fords of the school parlleled very much with those developed by
the Axis armies.
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Figure 13. Standard Mine Clearing Drill. 59
Those basically were as follows. Task forces were formed,
normally under the command of a divisional engineer headquarters,
consisting of infantry, special mine-flailing tanks, and combat
engineers. As this combat team neared the mined area, supported
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by all-arras cover fire, the engineers moved forward and blew gaps
in the wire, the infantry (reconnaissance party) passed into the
mined area to spearhead the advance, while the engineers cleared
lanes for follow-on vehicles. Finally, the combat engineers
laid protective minefields for the infantry which dug in on
their objectives, while the armored formations, with their own
combat engineers, passed through the bridgehead to exploit the
breach. gg When necessary, infantry tanks or mine-flailing tanks
were used to assist in the operation.
To enhance engineer participation in offensive operations,
efforts were made to improve the survivability of the combat
engineers, especially those supporting armored formations, and to
establish a flexible engineer command and control. By the time
of the British offensive, many of the divisional engineer field
sguadrons had been partially equipped with either Daim ler or
White armored scout cars and, shortly thereafter, the divisional
field engineer companies were partially equipped with these
vehicles and/or Br en armored personnel carriers. g^ More
importantly, wireless communication was established throughout
the combat engineer organization, down to and including the
platoon level. g2 Thus, for the first time in the Western Desert
conflict, the Commanders, Royal Engineers (CRE) at the corps and
divisional levels could contol and coordinate the engineer effort
throughout their sectors of responsibility. These new
capabilities provided much better efficiency and economy in the
engineer effort, since the combat engineer now possessed a
mobility capability equal to that of the units he supported, and
the ability to manage major engineer activities in support of
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widely dispersed and rapidly moving operations, which the
Commonwealth forces now attempted to utilize in earnest, for the
first time.
Prior to Operation Lightfoot in late October 1942, extensive
training had been conducted to indoctrinate and familiarize fully
8th Army troops with the new techniques and equipment. This is
not to say that the customary features of British strategy and
tactics had been supplanted by the dynamic attributes of dynamic
warfare. Quite to the contrary, the 8th Army principles of
command and control actually used during the ensuing offensive
had been altered very little. With little exception, operational
planning was still characterized by calculated method and the
rigid adherence to systems as well as caution and the lack of
resolute decisions. As a result, the battlefield tactics were
less than vigorous, forceful maneuver restrained, and success
not exploited in any great depth but confined to occupation of
the conquered positions.
Under the circumstances not much else could be expected.
The magic of General Rommel's reputation, together with the
healthy respect which the awsome German combined-arms combat
potential had earned, tended to intimidate British morale. At
the same time, the formidableness of the Axis field-fortified
lines at El Alamein, probably the most ominous defensive system
ever constructed, g, could have fostered nothing but apprehension,
especially when considering the fatal results of the British
attack on the So 1 lum-Ha 1 faya-Sidi Omar line, less than a year
before.
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El Alamein offered the British the opportunity to conduct an
offensive along the line that they were more familiar with. More
importantly, it allowed them to test extensively their first real
attempt at combined-arms attack in conjunction with an offensive
which guaranteed success. Where the German soldier was a
combined-arms master by nature, the Commonwealth soldier still
had to be convinced that he too should be one; Operation
Lightfoot helped him to gain this cognizance. Seldom again would
the combat arms fight according to their own rules, since, as
seen in the case of the divisional engineers, only the combining
of their respective capabilities on an equal basis would enable
the British army to wage mechanized warfare effectively, a
principle which the other Allied powers were soon to realize
also.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
During the period between the end of World War I and the
battle of El Alamein in October/November 1942, the influence of
the divisional combat engineer on battlefield operations
increased considerably. This was due, primarily, to the demands
of mechanized warfare, where the importance for effective
mobility and counter-mobility methods and, consequently, the
necessity for the employment of combat engineers in the very
thick of battle was realized on a scale which far outreached what
most military leaders had anticipated. The blitzkrieg formula
proved that the consolidated and strategic utilization of armored
vehicles was far superior to the commonly held belief that they
were best fitted to support traditional tactical methods. More
importantly, as the evolution of combat engineer employment and
function have illustrated, the key to the success of the dynamic
thrust lay in its effective application of combined-arms
techniques
.
The process which ultimately resulted in the cooperation
between arms as the accepted doctrine of European armies,
primarily involved incorporating the capabilities of the
historically uninf luentia 1 technical support arms on an equal
basis with the primary combat branches. This was particularly so
in the case of the combat engineer who, for centuries, had been
inhibited from exercising his full support potential on the
battlefield. From its very origins in the 16th century until the
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beginning of the 20th century, the combat engineer as a branch of
service existed as an uncongenial element in the various European
miltary establishments, due to his technical character and the
affiliation of his leadership with the bourgeoise. Dominated by
the chivalric and romantic conservatism of their aristocratic
officer corps, the opposing armies during World War I continued
to base their strategy and tactics on the axiom that the infantry
and, to a lesser degree at this time, the cavalry, were the
fundamental constituents of the military organizations. The
combat engineers, together with the other technical branches, and
the unique mechanical aids and capabilities which they possessed,
continued to be employed in subservient roles as part of
tactically estranged operations. The one exception to this
general scheme was the evolution of the Stoss formation within
the German army. However, the Reichsheer was unable to develop
this technical innovation into a strategic potential before the
1914-18 War ended.
Despite the efforts of the military intellectuals and the
adherents of mechanized landpower, who advocated the further
development of the new military innovations as the basis of
future warfare, the traditional attitudes prevailed in the
victorious Allied nations who, seduced by the victor's sydrome
and influenced by the old military elites, continued during the
inter-war years to base their stratgem on the features of past
campaigns. The armored formations which evolved in these nations
were developed by the infantry-minded military leadership as mere
aids, to help them conduct combat operations along familiar
lines. By ignoring the ultimate principle of mechanized warfare
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theory, the cooperation of arms, new weapons and equipment were
adopted without considering their possible roles in coordinated
efforts of the various branches of service. Instead, new
developments were sandwiched into already existing strategical
and tactical doctrines, with no real thought given to the changes
they might cause, if employed differently. Thus, the combat
engineer developed no methods for supporting armored warfare, nor
was he equipped to do so. Rather, as all other combat branches,
the divisional engineers prepared to participate in combat
according to their own rules.
In contrast, the totalitarian nations, Italy and Germany,
through the influence of Fascism with its corporate spirit and
aggressive nationalism, developed a strong affinity to mechanized
warfare. With the transition for their military organizations
from armies of a professional elite to that of an armed society,
the way was clear for the capabilities of the technical arms to
be more fully incorporated into combat operations. Consequently,
both nations developed independent, combined-arms armored
formations and doctrines for their strategic use in full
accordance with the concepts of the mechanized landpower
theorists. Although Italy, due to both the lack of time and
inadequate industrial and technological processes, was prevented
from developing her mechanized force into a viable offensive
capability, Germany was not. Through realization of the
Blitzkrieg formula, the German armed forces revolutionized
warfare and, for the first time in modern history, the combat
engineer functioned as an essential element in both strategical
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and tactical operations.
The German Panzer division, as a highly flexible formation
of all arms, depended as much on the capabilities of its
engineers for its dynamics as on any other of its combat arms.
More importantly, its brilliant successes on the battlefield were
ascribed primarily to its systematic practice of the cooperation
of arms with the divisional engineer playing a fundamental role.
As the proponent for mobility and counter-mobility, the combat
engineer was indoctrinated in hasty type operations and, most
times, assisted by the conventional arms as well as placed over
them in order to accomplish these tasks most efficiently. To
allow him to carry out his mission, the combat engineer was
provided with the weapons, vehicles, and equipment which gave him
both survivability and mobility potentials equal to the units he
supported. In addition, an effective engineer command and
control structure was established to facilitate the planning and
coordination of concerted efforts in engineering matters. In
these ways, the German combat engineer contributed significantly
to the Blitzkrieg formula and helped to reintroduce dynamic
mobility to the modern battlefield.
As the conflict on the Western Desert illustrates, the
superiorty of the German methods in mechanized warfare completely
overwhelmed the traditional procedures of the British, whose
primary deficiciency lay in the lack of a combined-arms effort.
When with a considerable advantage in weapons, tanks, and men,
the Commonwealth forces, due to their inferior organization and
employment techniques, could hardly lock horns with the awesome
German armored formations. Ultimately, the British had to adopt
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the ways of the Axis powers in order to beat them. For the
British combat engineer, this meant forsaking the rear of the
battlefield and deliberate type operations to take an equal
position on the front lines, and adopting hasty methods to
support combat operations. It was only when the British
amalgamated the capabilities of the combat engineer with those of
the other combat arms that they could achieve success on the
modern battlefield.
The potential of mechanized forces in modern warfare depends
primarily on their ability to apply the cooperation of arms. The
unique capabilities of each combat arm must be integrated to a
maximum into combat operations, especially those of the
divisional engineers. Any armored formation with self-imposed
limitations on its mobility and counter-mobility sacrifices the
dynamics on which its existence is based and is doomed to fail
when faced with the demands of the modern battlefield.
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, and by Larry Addington in The
Blitzkrieg Era and the German General Staff 1865-1941
.
The following military journals offer specific information
about the role of the combat engineer in mechanized operations:
Rivista di Artiglieria e Genio , Viertel jahreshefte fuer Pioniere,
The Royal Engineer Journal
, Revue du Genie Militaire
, and Revue
Militaire Generals.
Critical analyses of the concepts for the employment of
forces in the armored battles in North Africa are provided in
Erwin Rommel's The Rommel Papers
, Correlli Barnett's The Desert
Generals
,
J.A.I. Agar-Hamilton's The Sidi Rezeg Battles
, and S.O.
Playfair's The Mediterranean and M idd le East
, vols. II and III.
While these works excellently cover the inadequacies of the
British army in the conduct of mechanized operations, the
following official military engineering histories portrait the
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resolution of these shortcomings through the adoption of
combined-arms techniques: J.F. Coty, New Zea l and Engineers
,
Middle East
, Edward Sandes, The Indian Engineers 1939-1947
,
and
R.P. Pakenham-Walsh, History of the Corps of Roya l Engineers
,
vol. VIII.
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For centuries, the combat engineer has, in various degrees,
influenced battlefield operations. However, until the advent of
mechanized warfare, this combat support arm had been inhibited
from exercising its full potential in assisting armies, on both
the tactical and strategical levels. From its very origins, the
combat engineer arm, due to its technical character and the
affiliation of its leadership with the bourgeoisie, evolved as an
uncongenial element in the various European military
establishments, which were dominated by the chivalric and
romantic conservatism of their aristocratically based officer
corps. When the nature of armed conflict transended from limited
to total warfare, and technology began to play a decisive role in
military actions, the influence of the combat engineer on
battlefield operations started to increase. As a consequence,
those military establishments which most effectively incorporated
the capabilities of the combat engineer as well as the other
technical arms into their military operations greatly improved
their overall tactical and strategical advantage. In addition,
the intoduction of the tracked armored fighting vehicle to combat
operations offered a weapon, which could revolutionize warfare,
to those who properly developed it. How this new warmachine was
militarily assimilated and employed in relation with the existing
combat and combat support arms determined its effectiveness on
the battlefield.
Through the review of the theories, processes, and
developments, which led to the evolution of armored formations,
this thesis offers an insight into the importance of mobility and
counter-mobility and into the essential function played by the
combat engineer on the dynamic battlefield. Through historical
developments it is illustrated how the application of the
combined-arms concept, with the combat engineer as a primary
member, became the key to success in the dynamic, mobile warfare
which dominated the World War II campaigns in North Africa.
